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INTRODUCTION

In July, 1974 Congress passed into law the Congres

sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.

This

Act required Congress to do what it had never before
accomplished: to fit isolated, unrelated fiscal decisions
into a framework of a logical, coherent budget process,
which would allow Congress to deal with the Federal
budget as a rational whole.

The purpose of this research

effort is to evaluate the reforms of the Congressional

Budget Act.

In particular, this paper will evaluate the

budget process, established by the 1974 Budget Act, in

terms of its policy-making function.

Hence, the analysis

will not concern itself with the economics of the new budget

process, but instead will examine the new budget process
as a Congressional policy-making tool.

It will seek to

determine whether the Congressional budget process has
satisfied its legislative objectives; whether it has
ensured effective Congressional control over the budget

process and the establishment of national budget prior
ities.

Further, it will analyze Congressional efforts to

implement the budget timetable, to

establish budgetary

information within Congress, and to establish Congress
as an equal partner with the Executive branch in the

making of Federal budget policy.
The scope of this analysis will be limited due
to several constraints.

First, the Congressional budget

process is yet in its infancy and any attempt to provide
a complete and thorough evaluation is still premature.
In addition, the politics of the Congressional budget
process preclude a thorough evaluation.

The issues are

complex, and practical considerations mandate that this

analysis present but an overview of the Congressional
process as established by the 1974 legislation.

The

ensuing discussion will not delve into the provisions of
impoundment control.

Indeed, the subject of impoundment

control reform could be the topic of an entire research
project itself.

In attempting to evaluate the reform provisions of
the 1974 Budget Act, this research project will be
divided into three major sections.

The first section

will include Chapters I and II, and will provide back
ground information regarding Congressional budget reform.
Chapter I examines the historical roots of the Congres
sional budget functions.

The discussion focuses upon the

specific legislative actions which have led to the reform

of 1974.

Chapter II investigates the factors which caused

Congress to re-examine its role in the budget process.
It discusses in some detail the specific provisions of

the 1974 Congressional Budget Act.

The second major section of this research effort
consists of the analysis of the implementation of the new
budget process in Congress, again focusing upon the policy
implications of the process.

Chapter III 'Implementing

the New Procedures' provides a chronological analysis of
Congressional implementation of the new budget procedures

beginning with the 1975 'trial run' through the fifth
year of operation - 1979.

Chapter IV examines the

effectiveness of the institutions established by the

1974 Budget Act, namely the Congressional Budget Commit
tees and the Congressional Budget Office.

The chapter

focuses specifically upon the many factors which have
acted to affect the effectiveness of each of these insti

tutions in performing their respective functions.
The final section of this research project encom
passes Chapters V and VI.

Chapter V discusses many of the

proposals which have been suggested to further xeforra
the Congressional budget process, including proposed
changes of the budget timetable, reforms of the Budget
Committees, alterations of the scope of the Congressional
budget, and reforms of budget studies.

Chapter VI, the

concluding chapter of this study, evaluates the success

with which Congress has achieved the legislative objec
tives of the 1974 Budget Act.

An attempt is made to deter

mine whether Congress has successfully implemented the

provisions of the Budget Act, and hence utilized the

policy tool which it has provided.

Finally, the chapter

concludes with some subjective recommendations based
upon the evaluation.

CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATIVE BUDGET

Section 8 of Article I of the Federal Constitution

enumerates the specific powers of the Congress in the
realm of public policy.

This section empowers Congress

to act in eighteen particular fields.

The revenue,

borrowing, and coinage powers of section 8 constitute the

Congressional power of the purse.

Specifically, the

Constitution empowered Congress to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises; to pay the debts and to pro

vide for the common defense and general welfare of the

United States (Article I, section 8); to borrow money
on the credit of the United States; and to make appro

priations(section 9).^ "In the Federalist Papers,
Alexander Hamilton envisioned this power would enable
Congress to overcome 'all the overgrown prerogatives of
the other branches of the government.

This power of the

purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and
effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the
2

immediate representatives of the people'."

In actuality

the Congressional role in the budget process became

^U.S. Const, art. I, sec. 8 and sec. 9.
2

Joel Havemann, Congress and the Budget (Bloomington,
Illinois; Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 3.

secondary to that of the Executive.

This chapter will

examine the evolving nature of the budget process in
Congress.

Discussion will center upon specific legis

lative actions which have impacted the Congressional budget
process, and which led to the reform of the Congressional
budget process with the 1974 Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act.

Despite the predictions of Alexander Hamilton that
Congress would effectively command the constitutional

power of the purse, early in the history of the United
States, Congress set in motion the committee structure
which would dictate the decentralized Congressional budget
approach.

Congress divided the budget responsibility among

its many committees.

The income authority became vested

in one committee in the House, another in the Senate.

Control over spending was divided among thirteen appro—

pfra^ons committees in each house and ten or fifteen other
3

committees.

This lack of coordination in the Congressional

fiscal machinery would continue to hamper Congressional
control of the budget into the twentieth century.

Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
Following the close of World War I a shift toward

centralization of budget responsibilities occurred as a
result of the huge budget deficits incurred in the war.

^Ibid.

Congress passed into law the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921 which centralized budget authority in the Executive
branch.

Prior to this, budget requests were sent directly

to Congress.

The Budget and Accounting Act established

a Bureau of the Budget in the Treasury Department with

responsibility of coordination of all Executive budget
requests.

Congress, although it had constitutional auth

ority, had permitted the Executive agencies to determine
appropriations in practice.

In fact, until July, 1920

a total of nine committees in the House shared the auth

ority to report appropriations bills.

This situation was

altered in 1920 when House rules were amended to form a
4

single Appropriations Committee.

Thus, the continued

sense of frustration involved in efforts both to control

estimates and to give adequate review to expenditures,
together with a new budgetary situation at the conclusion
of World War I, caused Congress to turn to new solutions.
The return of the Republicans to office provided the final

impetus for passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of

1921.^
Under the provisions of the Budget and Accounting
Act, the President was given the responsibility for trans
4

John S. Saloma III, "The Responsible Use of Poweri

A Critical Analysis of the Congressional Budget Process,"
in Congress and the Federal Budget, ed. American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Washing
ton, D.C., 1965), p. 114.

^Ibid.

mitting to the Congress, at the beginning of each session,
a national budget.

In addition, the President was auth

orized to submit supplemental or deficiency estimates as
necessary due to laws enacted subsequent to transmittal

of the budget.

The Act created the Bureau of the Budget

headed by a Director of the Budget appointed by the President
and directly responsible to him.

Section 207 of the Act

empowered the Bureau to "assemble, correlate, revise,

reduce or increase" the estimates of the Federal depart

ments.

Section 209 provided the Bureau with authority to

complete studies of the departments to enable the President

to determine necessary changes in the Federal Executive
g
structtire.

Congress provided a broad role for the newly formed
General Accounting Office (GAG) in the budgetary process.

The GAD assumed powers and duties previously exercised by
the Comptroller of the Treasury and the six auditors of

the Department of the Treasury including the power to
settle or adjust all claims and demands; the power to in

vestigate all matters relating to the receipt, disburse
ment, and application of public funds; and to make regular
reports to Congress with recommendations looking to
greater economy of efficiency in public expenditures.

®Ibid., p. 115.
^Ibid., p. 116.

7

Although the GAO was created by the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921 as an agency of Congress and part of the legis
lative branch of government. Congressional expectations
of the GAO participation were not realized.

(Representative) Good anticipated three positive
results.

First, the GAO would inform Congress as

to 'the actual conditions' surrounding the expen
diture of public funds in every department of the
government.

Second, it would serve as 'a check

on the President and those under him in the prep
aration of the budget.' Third, it would help
Congress to locate waste and extravagant use of

funds and to place responsibility on the approp
riate cabinet officer.®

Expansion of the Executive branch role

iri the Federal budget process

The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 marked the

beginning of Executive dominance in the budget process.
Although Congress had intended the President to centralize

and coordinate the Executive agencies' budget requests to
Congress, it is equally clear that Congress envisioned

the GAO as a powerful Congressional aid in providing for
a greater degree of Executive branch accountability in
budget execution and coordination.

The Commission on

Organization of the Executive Brancb of the Government in

the Task Force Report on Fiscal, Budgeting, and Accounting
Activities stated:

To carry Executive accountability for the execution
of the budget one step further, the Executive branch

of the Government should have the authority through
g

Ibid., pp. 116-7.

10

the proper agencies to prescribe administrative
accounting systems, and to settle and adjust all
claims.

These are now functions of the General

Accounting Office, an agency over which the President
has practically no control. It is widely understood
at present that in drafting the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921, it was a mistake to have given these
functions to that Office. This improper distribution
of fiscal authority has hampered the President and
the administrative agencies through 27 years and,
even worse, has prevented the General Accounting
Office from becoming, as it should have, a powerful
congressional aid in ferreting out extravagance and

misuse of funds and in bringing the Executive to
account for the execution of the budget. Instead
of that, the Office has spent time over these years
in auditing and settling millions of vouchers and
claims, which had already been administratively
audited and paid, and in legal hairsplitting over
what was fitting and proper down to the minutest
detail. Congress should be quite critical of the
paucity of substantial reports and audits, which
its committees could actually get their teeth into,
that have come from the General Accounting Office
since its establishment.

In contrast, the 1921 Act equipped the President
with his own budget staff in the form of the Bureau of the
Budget and gave him broad powers to superintend agency

expenditures.

Subsequently there were enlargements of

the scope and power Of the President's role in the budget
process which were achieved mainly through Executive
orders and reorganizations.

Soon after passage of the

1921 Act, President Harding appointed Charles G. Dawes

as the first director of the Budget Bureau.

Dawes issued

Budget Circular 49 which initiated the process of central
clearance of budget requests.

"The circular stated that

9

George B. Galloway, The Legislative Process in
Congress (New York; Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1953),
pp. 1.32-3.

11

all agency proposals for legislation 'the effect of which
would be to create a charge upon the public treasury or
coinmit the government to obligations which would later

require appropriations,' must be submitted to the Budget
Bureau before congressional action was sought.

Although

Harding did not actively utilize the central clearance
power, it became an important tool of President Calvin

Coolidge.

Coolidge used the central clearance in effecting

reduced public expenditures and greater economy in govern
ment.

This style of clearance policy review was continued

in practice with the Hoover Administration.
In response to the Great Depression and subsequent
social programs of the 1930's. President Roosevelt took
a more active budget-making role.

In 1933, Roosevelt

issued Executive Order 6166, which modified the Antideficiency
Act of 1.905.

The Antideficiency Act had placed the auth

ority with department heads to apportion funds throughout
the fiscal year to prevent premature expenditure of funds
and resulting budget deficiencies.

The 1933 order trans

ferred the functions of 'making, waiving, and modifying

apportionments of appropriations' from department heads
to the budget director
In 1934, Roosevelt announced at a National Emergency

James P. Pfiffner, The President, the Budget and
Congress: Impoundment and the 1974 Budget Act (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1979)., p. 16.

^^Ibid., p. 17.

12

Council meeting that he wanted all proposals for legis
lation to be cleared before going on to Congress, not just

those concerning expenditures.

Budget Circular 336

provided that legislation solely concerning policy matters
be referred to the President through the staff of the

National Emergency Council.

Roosevelt utilized the new

process by categorizing proposed legislation as unaccept
able, acceptable, or 'must* legislation, with only the
12

latter category receiving presidential support.

With the decline of New Deal legislation, the role

of the National Emergency Council as a legislative clear
ance agency was abolished.

However, the role of the Budget

Bureau was enlarged to provide the legislative clearance
function with the enactment of Budget Circular 344 in

1937.

By 1939, the Budget Bureau included a full time

staff which coordinated legislation and controlled all

agency recommendations concerning the signature or veto
13
of enrolled bills.

In 1937, President Roosevelt's Committee on Admin
istrative Management consisting of Louis Brownlow, Charles
E. Merriam, and Luther Gulick submitted its report on the

management of the Federal government.

The Committee recom

mendations included the proposed expansion of the White

Ibid.

^^Richard E. Neustadt, "Presidency and Legislation:
The Growth of Central Clearance," American Political
Science Review 48: 644.

13

House staff, the development of the managerial agencies
of government, an extension of the merit system, the
institution of independent agencies into one of several
major Executive departments, and the establishment of
independent postaudits of all fiscal transactions by an
14

auditor general.

The Reorganization Act of 1939 incor

porated some of the Brownlow Committee recommendations

in that the Act provided that the President could propose
plans to Congress to transfer functions from one agency
to another, to consolidate functions, or to abolish
agencies.

The Act created the Executive Office of the

Presidency and placed the Budget Bureau within it.

The

result of this Act, and the previously mentioned develop
ments of the 1930's, was a greatly expanded role for the
Budget Bureau including coordination of all governmental
activities, the clearance of recommendations to the Pres

ident, and the investigation of administrative problems
-15

throughout the Federal government.

Decline of Congressional Budget Control
Paralleling the growth of the Executive role in
the budgetary process was the corresponding decline of
Congressional budget control.

In 1920, Congress had

placed the management of all appropriations bills within

^^Pfiffner, p. 18.
^^Ibid., p. 19.

14

the purview of the two Appropriations Committees' res

ponsibilities.

However, Congress soon found alternative

ways of locating spending authority in other committees.
In 1932 the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was
authorized to borrow money directly from the Treasury.

This action occurred without the opportunity of an
Appropriations Committee review of the bill.

Other legis

lation was passed, such as the 1935 Social Security
legislation, which made permanent appropriations for
programs entitling individuals to Federal benefits.

This

'backdoor spending,' which was the term for spending
enacted without Appropriations Committee action, was to
grow for the next forty years and account for about one-

third of the total Federal budget.^^
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
Congress attempted to reassert its role in the

budget process by passing the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 3.946.

This Act introduced an important new pro

cedure in Federal budgeting - Congressional determination
of an appropriation and expenditure ceiling.

Prior to

passage of the Act the various committees on tax and ex
penditure had no opportunity to secure a unified view of
Federal financial activities.

The House Ways and Means

Committee and the Senate Finance Committee had acted upon
16

Havemann, p. 9.

15

revenue measures without knowledge of the size and char

acter of appropriations under consideration by the House
and Senate Appropriations Committees.

The twelve com

mittees of the House Appropriations Committee had operated
in virtual isolation from the rest of Congress.

There

had been no opportunity for consideration of the total
impact of appropriations measures.

The 1946 Act was

Congress' attempt to rectify this situation.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 XLRA) had the
following objectives:

1.

To streamline and simplify Congressional committee
structure.

2.
3.

To eliminate the use of special or select committees.
To clarify committee duties and reduce juris
dictional disputes.
To regularize and publicize committee procedures.
To improve Congressional staff aids.

4.
5.
6.

To reduce the work load on Congress.

7.

To strengthen legislative oversight of admin
istration.

8.

To reinforce the power of the purse.

9.

To regulate lobbying.

10.

To increase the compensation of Members of

^7

Congress and provide them with retirement pay.
The Act also intended to provide the occasion for an
overall review of the budget.

Dr. George B. Galloway,

staff director for the LaFollette-Monroney Committee
which drafted the 1946 legislation, contended the procedure
was a necessary modernization of Congressional budget
18

planning.

17

The Act was viewed as affording a greater
.

.

.

George B. Galloway, The Legislative Process in

Congress (New York: Thomas Y. Croweil Company, 1.953), p. 591.
18

Idem, Congress at the Crossroads (New York;
Thomas Y. Croweil Company, 1946), p. 254.

16

degree of Congressional budget supervision.

The Coramittee

on the Reorganization of Congress CLaFollette-Monroney
Coramittee) stated, "The Executive has mingled appro
priations, brought forward and backward unexpended and
anticipated balances, incurred coercive deficiencies and

otherwise escaped the rigors of Congressional control."1 9

Closely linked with this reassertion of Congressional bud
getary control was the argument that the legislative budget

would achieve economy by balancing the budget annually.
Both the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of

the Bureau of the Budget supported the concept of the legis
lative budget.

Upon signing into law the Legislative

Reorganization Act of 1946, President Truman stated,

"The legislative budget and the provisions on the handling
of appropriations will undoubtedly result in a clearer
and more realistic relationship between the income and
20

expenditure sides of the budget."

The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, section
1.38, created a Joint Committee on tbe Budget.

The Joint

Committee was composed of members of the two Appropriations
Committees, the House Ways and Means, and Senate Finance

Committees.

The Coramittee was chaxged with the responsi

bility of meeting at the beginning of each Congressional
19

92 Congressional Record Part 8, p. 10047 (July

25, 1946).
20

92 Congressional Record, p. 10777 (August 2,

1946)..

17

session to study the President's budget and report a

legislative budget for the ensuing fiscal year, including
the estimated over-all Federal receipts and expenditures.

This report, which was due for delivery to the respective
houses by February 15, was to contain a recommendation
for the Ttiaximura amount to be appropriated, and would be

accompanied by a concurrent resolution adopting this
21

budget and fixing the appropriations ceiling.

In the first session of the 80th Congress, the

Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget met and after

considerable debate agreed to trim $6 billion from the
President's budget.

This decision was duly reported to

the House, which passed a resolution of intent to imple
ment the decision.

However, the Senate refused to adopt

the resolution, the majority insisting upon a budget cut
of no more than $4.5 billion.

Thus, Congress failed to

agree on a legislative budget the first year.
With the close of the J.947 session. Congressman

Monroney reviewed the progress achieved under the Legis
lative Reorganization Act and stated the reason the legis
lative budget had been a failure was due to the lack of
staff work prior to the convening of Congress in January,
1947.

In September, 1947, Senator Bridges announced that

staff representatives of the House and Senate Appropriations
21

Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of

Administration (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1964), p. 132.

18

Coinmittees would attend upcoming Bureau of the Budget
hearings on the Executive budget.

The information thus

gathered would enable Congress to make intelligent

decisions regarding the budget.

The Bureau of the Budget,

however, refused to allow Congressional staff attendance

and with no more preliminary budget review than the first
session, the second session of Congress under the provisions
22

of the LRA fared little better.

The Joint Committee

eventually agreed on a $2.5 billion cut in the Presiden

tial budget.

This was reported to Congress and enacted

by Senate resolution on February iB and on February 27 in
23

the House.

Nevertheless, Congress voted funds in excess

of this legislative ceiling.

Both the majority and minority members of Congress
were extremely critical of the legislative budget.

Con

gressmen criticized the concurrent resolution as being
too general to be of assistance to the financial commit

tees.

Complaints were voiced that the February deadline

was much too early in the session to determine an expen

diture ceiling with any degree of accuracy, that savings
could actually be achieved only through the work of the
Appropriations Committees and that it was incorrect to
24

claim a savings before it was realized.

When Congress

22

Jesse V. Burkhead, "Federal Budgetary Developments:

1947-48," Public Administration Review 8 (Autumn 1948): 270.
23

Senate Concurrent Resolution 42; House Resolution

485, 80th Congress, 2d session (1948).
24

94 Congressional Record 1453-62 (February 18,

1948); Ibid., 1939-50 (February 27, 1948).

19

attempted for the third time in 1949 to formulate the

legislative budget, it extended the reporting deadline
from February 15 to May 1.

Nevertheless this deadline

came and went without Congressional action.

The outcome

was that Section 138 remained a dead letter for the next

two decades until repealed by the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1970.

Reasons for the Failure of the Legislative

Reorganization Act of 194T
The 1946 Legislative Reorganization Act proved to
be faulty in concept and impractical in operation.

First,

there was a lack of time and information, both of which

wexe necessary to meet the tight deadline of February 15.
The mid-February deadline provided the Joint Committee

adequate opportunity to affect the level of appropriations
and expenditures, but an inadequate amount of time for

budget review.

Congress could not intelligently estab

lish a budgetary total until the components were examined
in detail, and this would have required a Congressional

staff to provide Congress with additional budget infor
mation.

The Joint Committee was also criticized for recom

mending large reductions in the spending level without
any specifications concerning which programs would be
reduced.

There was no itemized estimate of major program

reductions included in the Joint Committee's first session

20

report or in the concurrent resolution, despite the fact
that the House proposed a $6 billion reduction and the
Senate a $4.5 billion cut.

This spending reduction rep

resented a major policy decision, but there was not the
25

slightest indication on how it should be executed.

Another factor which frustrated implementation of

the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was the failure
of the House and Senate to agree on the disposition of
anticipated budget surpluses.

The Act had called for

debt retirement, but the Joint Committee had recommended

that only 'a portion* of the expected surplus be applied
to the debt in 1947.

This left an ideal opportunity for
26

a tax cut which the Republicans favored.

The Senate

proposed other methods of disposing of the anticipated

surplus.

The result was the conference committee became

deadlocked mainly on the debt retirement issue, the con
current resolution was allowed to die in conference, and

the legislative budget failed to materialize in 1947.
The large size of the Joint Committee (102 members)
proved to be unwieldy.

This was somewhat alleviated when

the Committee decided to operate through a subcommittee

of twenty, with five members taken from each comn^ittee.
The creation of the subcommittee made the Joint Committee

25

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government

Operations, "Experience with a Legislative Budget" Testimony
by Louis Fisher before Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management
and Expenditures. Improving Congressional Control of the
Budget. Hearings Part II, 93d Congress, Jst session, 1973,
p. 238.
26

Ibid.

21

more workable, but it also provoked criticism that the
Joint Committee was reduced essentially to 'a pro forma
27

ratification of the recommendations of the subcommittee.'

In addition to the large committee size, there was a void

of permanent staff to enable the Joint Committee to make
independent studies of budget estimates.

Thus, Congress

was severely dependent upon the President and the Bureau
of the Budget for information.

Further, the February

deadline forced the Joint Committee to act on the basis

of the initial agency estimates prior to the time that the
departments offered their revised estimates and budget
amendments.

This meant a legislative budget would be

formulated which would most likely be in considerable
error.

Finally, the political atmosphere in 2947-48 was
a contest between a Republican Congress and a Democratic
President.

"One of the main reasons for the failure to

implement the legislative budget successfully is that it
was perceived as a political tool to be used against the
opposition party.

Representative Clarence Cannon argued

that the Republican party 'attempted to use the legis

lative budget as a stepping stone in pursuit of its tax
28

program.'"

As will be discussed in the next chapter,

27

Ibid.

^^Pfiffner, pp. 221-2.

22

the fraiaers of the 1974 Act carefully reviewed the 1946

experience in attempting to overcome the faults inherent
in Section 138 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946.

Omnibus Appropriations Bill

In 1950 a short-lived attempt to consolidate all

general appropriations bills into one package was under
taken.

The omnibus procedure was inaugurated in 1950 by

the House Appropriations Committee under Representative
Cannon's leadership.

The Omnibus Bill was divided into

chapters which corresponded to the regular appropriations
acts of previous years.

The Senate Appropriations Com

mittee agreed to cooperate in the attempt to give this
new procedure a try.

In early 1950, Congress began

reviewing appropriations for fiscal year 1951 with the
Senate and House Appropriations subcommittees holding

hearings simultaneously.

Within each Appropriations

Committee the procedure was much the same as prior years.
Each committee member reviewed one chapter of the Omnibus

Bill, then the chapters were consolidated by an executive
subcommittee.

The bill was approved by House Appropriations

Committee on March 21, 1950 with the vote being strictly

along party lines.

All the voting Republicans opposed

the measure as appropriating too much money, while all the
Democrats voted for the bill.

The full committee had
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discussed the Omnibus Bill for but three hours.

As reported to the full House, the Omnibus Approp
riations Bill (H.R. 7786) was 431 pages in length.

Debate

on the Bill commenced on April 3, 1950, was terminated

on April 6, and thereafter the Bill was considered
chapter by chapter.

The House approved the Omnibus Bill

on May 10, 1950 at $1.2 billion below the Executive budget
^ 30
request.

The Senate Appropriations Committee did not complete
action on the Bill until July 8.

After four weeks con

sideration, the Senate approved the Omnibus Bill with
modifications.

The Conference Committee reported on

August 25, and the Senate approved it on August 28.

The

Bill was signed by President Truman on September 6, 1950.

Although this was two months earlier than budget action
had been completed in 1949, the new fiscal year had

already begun July 1.

Hence, before the Omnibus Bill

finally became law. Congress had to enact three joint
resolutions providing interim funds for the continued govern
ment operations.

Evaluations of the new procediore were mixed.

Chair

man Cannon stated, "the single appropriation bill offers
29

Dalmas H. Nelson, "The Omnibus Appropriations Act

of 1950,"

Journal of Politics 15(May 1953): 278-9.

^^Ibid., pp. 279-80.

^^Ibid., p. 280.
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the most practical and efficient method of handling the
32

annual budget and the national fiscal program."

Other

Congressmen were overwhelmed by the complex, voluminous
single appropriations bill.

Senator Kenneth McKellar of

the Senate Appropriations Committee declared that reviewing
it was "the most terrible experience I have had in my
33

whole life."

Representative William S. Cole confessed

to being "perplexed, bewildered, befuddled, and bemused.

Congress had succeeded in reducing the President's budget
in 1950 by more than $2 billion.

However, in fiscal 195J.

a total of five deficiency and supplemental appropriations
acts had to be passed.

While some of these were due to the

unexpected Korean War, the purpose of the single appro
35

priatxons bill was not fulfilled.

When the House Appro

priations Committee met in January, 1951 they voted to
abandon the single bill appropriations process.

The Senate

Appropriations Committee also opposed the omnibus system.
Thus, the history of budget-making in the United
States is a history of interaction between the Executive

and Legislative branches of the government.

Legislative

budget reformers in the 1970's learned valuable lessons

from the previous years of Congressional budgeting.
32
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passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which
established Executive dominance of the budgetary process,

Congress has made numerous attempts to reassert its role.
The culmination of these efforts occurred in 1974 with

the passage of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act.

An understanding of the events which led

to passage of the 1974 Act is essential.

The framers of

the 1974 Act carefully reviewed and studied previous

Congressional attempts at a Legislative budget.

The

next chapter will focus upon the development of the 1974

Act and the new budget procedures enacted into law with
passage of the Act.

CHAPTER II

THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT
CONTROL ACT OF 1974

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control

Act of 1974 charged Congress to do what had never been
done previously; to fit isolated, unrelated fiscal
decisions into a logical, coherent process, treating the
Federal budget as a rational whole.

The need for that

reform had been widely recognized in Congress as discussion
in the previous chapter indicated.

However, the immediate

stimulants to Congressional budget reform were the deteri
orating economy of the 1970's and the unprecedented use
of presidential impoundments.

The purpose of this chapter

is to investigate the factors which caused Congress to

re-examine its role in the budget process and to discuss
the provisions of the Congressional Budget Act as enacted
into law by Congress in 1974.

Roots of Reform

Prior to passage of the 1974 Act tlve history of

budgeting in Congress could be best characterized as frag
mented.

Congress would take the Executive budget, divide

and subdivide it into small parcels and apportion each

26
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part among many committees and subcommittees.

Each

committee and subcommittee would then work on its section

with little, if any, regard for the impact its decisions

would have upon the total budget.

This fragmented approach

to the budget resulted in many problems which increasingly
hampered the Congressional

budget process.

By the early 1970's, it was obvious that Congress
lacked overall fiscal control.

The reasons for this were

many and complex, and corresponded to the growth and
complexity of the American society itself.
size of the Federal

First, the

budget and its impact on the American

economy had increased tremendously.

The budget had grown

from $3 billion to over $300 billion in less than 50 years;

in forty years, and since the turn of the century, the
national debt had risen from $3. billion to nearly $500

billion.

Although the budget had become the principal tool

for determining Federal goals and economic policy. Congress
in 1970 still lacked a comprehensive mechanism for estab

lishing priorities among goals and for determining economic
36

policy through the budget process.

Second, past budget reform efforts had enhanced and

centralized budget authority in the Executive branch while

permitting increased fragmentation of

budget authority

U.S. Congress, House, Committee on the Budget,
The Congressional Budget and impoundment Control Act of
1974; A General Explanation, by George Gross, Executive
Director, House Committee on the Budget, October, 1975,
p. 1.
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within Congress.

The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921

had vested responsibility with the President for the
preparation and submittal of an Executive budget to the
Congress.

It also established the Bureau of the Budget

within the Executive branch to administer the new budget
system.

These Congressional decisions permitted the

Executive to achieve a great concentration of financial
and policy-making authority, first, in the Budget Bureau,
and, recently, in the Office of Management and Budget.

37

Budget responsibility in Congress had remained
dispersed, despite periodic attempts to centralize budget
authority in the appropriations committees and to enact an
overall

legislative budget.

Congressional budget actions,

because of the piecemeal committee process, never explicitly
determined the size of the budget, whether it should be
in a surplus or deficit condition, and specifically by

what amount.

In fact, the Congressional budget process

was merely the sum of many isolated and usually unrelated

actions, sometimes having the effect of stimulating the
economy when restraint was required, and visa versa.
Third, the nature and timing of Congressional budget

actions was ineffectual.

Appropriations bills were rarely

completed prior to the beginning of the fiscal year.

^^Ibid., p. 2.
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About 75 percent of the budget is regarded as

'relatively uncontrollable under existing law,' and
uncontrollables have been the fastest rising part of
the total budget. Backdoor spending represented more
than half of all spending. Outlays were completely

uncontrolled by Congress since Congressional budget
actions reached only to the authority to obligate
funds, resulting in little direct relationship be
tween Congressional budget actions and actual expen
ditures in any given year by the Executive branch.
Thus, Congress lacked a fiscal policy; it could not pursue
a fiscal policy because total levels of taxation, spending
and the deficit or surplus were not determined.

The inev

itable result was large deficits fueled by the political

process.

These factors formed the roots of budget reform

in Congress.

While reform of the Congressional budget process
had been an issue of continuing concern since World War

II, it was not until 1972 that Congress took steps toward

meaningful, permanent reform.

A unique series of circum

stances occurred which influenced Congressional action in

1972.

The normal disagreements between the President and

Congress over the budget, such as partisan differences
and the shifting of blame for deficits, assumed an aura
of constitutional crisis with the Nixon presidency.

A

breakdown of comity occurred in many areas and particularly
with regard to budget control.

Arguing over fiscal policy is a traditional game
played by the two branches, with each claiming that
it is responsible for saving more money than the

^®Ibid., p. 2.
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other. Presidential advisor John Ehrlichman spoke
about the 'credit-card Congress' that was recklessly
spending itioney without regard for the revenue necessary

to cover outlays.

President Nixon made accusations of

Congressional fiscal irresponsibility.^^
Congress reacted to the Executive branch accusations by
continuing to pursue its own fiscal priorities while
recognizing the deficiencies of the Congressional budget
process.

Legislation was introduced to limit the Pres

ident's use of impoundments and requiring the Senate con
firmation of the director of the Office of Management

and Budget.

The immediate precipitant for the J974 budget reform

was a dispute over President Nixon's spending ceiling
proposal in the fall of 1972.

"In a message to Congress

in July 1972 President Nixon argued that the current

budget crisis was caused by the fiscal irresponsibility
of Congress and asked for authority to hold fiscal 1973
40

spending to $250 billion."

This request stimulated

much debate in Congress concerning the issue of constitu
tional responsibility for the power of the purse.

If

Congress enacted the ceiling as requested, it would have
to make some difficult decisions about which programs to

cut, or give the President the authority to impound funds
as he chose.

If Congress refused the President's request.

^^Pfiffner, p. 120.
40

^Ibid., p. 122.
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Nixon would counter by terming the Democratic Congress a
group of reckless spenders, this with the election but a

few months away.

The issue caused considerable debate

in Congress with the result being a Congressional denial
of the request for Presidential authority to hold fiscal
1973 spending to $250 billion.

At the same time Congress,

recognizing the accuracy of the criticism of its inability
to control spending, established a Joint Study Committee
on Budget Control.

The mission of the Joint Study

Committee was to review "the procedures which should be
adopted by the Congress for the purpose of improving
Congressional control of budgetary outlay and receipt totals,

including procedures for establishing and maintaining an
overall view of each year's budgetary outlays which is
fully coordinated with an overall view of the anticipated
41

revenues for that year..."

The Joint Study Committee was composed of thirtytwo members, seven from each of the Senate and House

spending and tax committees, and four representing the
remainder of the House and Senate.

the first time January 10, 1973.

The Committee met for

An interim report was

issued by the Committee on February 7, -1973 delineating
the goals to be achieved, and analyzing the various defects

in the Congressional budget process to be revamped.
41

The

Debt Ceiling Act, Statutes at Large 86, section
301 (b), 1324 (1972)
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Committee began with the assumption that Congress should
have a more coherent budget process in order to permit

an enhancement of its position in relation to the President

and to provide a better mechanism to handle the general

problems of Federal revenue and spending.

The Joint

Committee published its final report in April 1973 and
legislation was introduced in both Houses to implement
the Committee recommendations.

Following significant

modification by both House and Senate committees, includ

ing the addition of anti-impoundment procedures originally
considered in separate legislation, both Houses overwhelmingly

approved the budget reform legislation. Final action in
both Houses was not completed until June 3.974, with the

bill being signed into law July 12, 1974 as Public Law
93-344.

The Congressional Budget Act
The 1974 Act contained ten titles establishing:

new Committees on the Budget in both the House and the

Senate, an independent Congressional Budget Office, a

budget timetable and new procedures for various phases of
the Congressional budget process, a new fiscal year,

improvements in budget terminology, program review and
evaluation procedures, and procedures for Congressional
review of Presidential impoundment actions.

Titles I and

II provided for the establishment of the House and Senate

Budget Committees and the Congressional Budget Office.
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The House Coininittee was to be composed of twenty-five
members, with five members from the Ways and Means Commit
tee, five from the Appropriations Committee, thirteen from
other standing committees and one member each from the

majority and minority leadership.

This membership com

position recognized the need for coordination of revenue

and expenditure actions by eliciting the membership of
Ways and Means and Appropriations Committees.

The Senate

Budget Committee was to consist of sixteen nembers, selected
from the Senate at large in the same manner as the other
Senate standing committees.
The House and Senate Committees were entrusted with

the responsibilities of: (1) reporting to their respective

Houses the matters required by Title III of the Act relating
to concurrent resolutions on the budget; (2) performing
continuing studies of the effect on budget outlays of
relevant existing and proposed legislation; (3) reques

ting and evaluating continuing studies of tax expenditures
and methods of coordinating tax expenditures with direct

budget outlays; and (4) reviewing the operations of the
42

Congressional Budget Office.

Section 306 of the Act

grants the Budget Committees exclusive jurisdiction over

any bill, resolution, or amendment which deals with any
matter covered by a concurrent resolution on the budget.
42

Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
of 3.974, U.S. Code, vol. 31, sections 101-2 (1974).
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The Budget Committees were created to guide the Congress
in the new tasks of establishing levels of total spending,

revenue, and debt.

These functions had not previously been

performed by any other committee.

Additionally, the Budget

Committees were not instituted with the intent of dimin

ishing the responsibilities or functions of other commit
tees.

However, some shifting of Congressional power

centers has occurred since implementation of the 1974
Act, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

The Congressional Budget Office, CBO, was estab

lished as a single agency by the Budget Act to: (1) monitor
the economy and estimate its impact upon Congressional
actions; (2) improve the amount and quality of budgetary
information; and (3) analyze the costs and effects of

budgetary choices.

The CBO was to be headed by a Director

appointed by the Speaker of the House and tbe President
pro tempore of the Senate after receiving recommendations
from the House and Senate Committees.

Title III of the Budget Act established a timetable
for the various phases of the Congressional budget process,

prescribing the actions to occur at each date (see Table
I).

The first element of the timetable is the submission

of a current services budget by the President to Congress.
The current services budget is an estimate of the cost of
maintaining all current programs in the forthcoming fiscal

year.

The purpose of this action is to provide the CBO

35

and the Budget Coiranittees at the earliest date possible
with detailed information with which to begin analysis

and preparation of the upcoming fiscal year's budget.
TABLE I

BUDGET PROCESS TIMETABLE

On or before;

Action to be completed:

November 10

President submits current
services budget

15th day after

Congress meets
March 15

President submits his budget
Committees and joint commit
tees submit reports to

Budget Committees

April 1

Congressional Budget Office
submits report to Budget
Committees

April 15

Budget Committees report
first concurrent resolution

on the budget to their
houses

May 15

Committees report bills and
resolutions authorizing
new budget authority

May 15

Congress completes action on
first concurrent resolution

on the budget

7th day after Labor Day

Congress completes action on
bills and resolutions pro

viding new budget authority
and new spending authority

September 15

Congress completes action on
second required concurrent
resolution on the budget

43
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TABLE I-Continued

On or before;

Action to be cdmpleted;

September 25

Congress completes action
on reconciliation bill

or resolution, or both,

implementing second required
concurrent resolution

October 1

Fiscal year begins

Shortly after submission of the President's budget
to Congress, the Budget Committees begin hearings on the
budget, economic assumptions, the economy and the national

budget priorities.

The first formal action by Congress is

the March 15 submission of reports by all committees with
jurisdiction over spending or tax legislation of the
types of programs other Congressional committees desire

in the coming fiscal year.
The Budget Act established, as a budget tool, con
current resolutioiB which require adoption by both the
House and the Senate, but not Presidential confirmation.

The first budget resolution sets targets designed to guide
Congress as it proceeds through action on spending bills.
Using the March 15 reports, the President's budget, the
CBO report and other information developed during hearings,
the Budget Committees prepare the resolution.

The resol

ution includes five budget totals - outlays, budget author
ity, revenue, deficit, and public debt level.

The confer

ence report on the resolution, written jointly by the

Budget Committees, allocates outlays and budget authority
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among Congressional committees, establishing committee
44

targets for total spending.

The committees must report legislation authorizing
spending in subsequent appropriations bills no later than
May 3-5.

Appropriations and tax bills may not be debated

by the full House or Senate until Congress adopts the

first budget resolution setting spending and revenue
targets.

By May 3.5, after a one month period for floor

consideration in each House, a conference on the resolution,

and the adoption of the conference reports. Congress

must pass the first budget resolution.

Then, in the

interim between adoption of the first budget resolution
and a week after Labor Day, Congress is required to act
on all regular spending and tax legislation.

September

3.5 and 25 are, respectively, the dates for adoption of
the second resolution and completion of the reconciliation
process, the final phase of the new budget process.
The second resolution affirms or revises, on the basis

of new information and data, changed economic circum
stances, and Congress' spending actions, the matters con
tained in the first resolution.

The second resolution is

binding; upon adoption, Congress may not enact a spending
bill which would require spending in excess of the
resolution's total or a tax bill which would decrease

revenue below the level specified in the resolution.
44
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addition, the second resolution may direct the appropriate
committees to determine and make any changes in legislation

required fay the resolution.

The reconciliation faill

would have the effect of reversing spending and revenue

decisions already made fay Congress.

The reconciliation

faill, if necessary, is to fae enacted fay Septemfaer 25 and
the new fiscal year faegins on Octofaer 1.

Title IV of the Budget Act estafalished new pro
cedures for the enactment of contract and faorrowing

authority in order to promote a more comprehensive and
consistent control over spending actions.

Effective

January 1976 all new contract authority and faorrowing
authority legislation irust contain a provision that the

new authority will fae effective only to the extent or in
such amounts as are provided in subsequent appropriations
acts.

Thus, the Act prohifaits new 'backdoor spending.'

The Congressional budget timetable, togeth-er with
the new controls on backdoor spending, estafalished a

tightly woven yet flexible set of new budget procedures

in Congress.

By beginning the consideration of the budget

in November, with the submission of the President's

current services budget, and changing the start of the
fiscal year to Octofaer 1, Congress now had nearly eleven
months to process the budget.

Titles V through IX of the Budget Act provided for

a change in the fiscal year; made various improvements in
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budget terminology and matters to be included in the

President's budget; provided for improved program review
and evaluations procedures; and specified the effective
dates for various provisions of the Act.

Title X dealt

with the issue of impoundment control, a companion measure

tacked onto the Budget Act.

The title recognized two types

of impoundment actions by the Ebcecutive branch: rescissions

and deferrals.

The President is required to propose

rescissions to Congress whenever he determines that: all
or part of any budget authority will not be needed to

fulfill the objectives of a particular program; budget
authority should be rescinded for fiscal reasons; or all
or part of budget authority provided for only one fiscal

year is to be reserved from obligation for that year.
"Unless both Houses of Congress complete action on a res

cission bill within 45 days, the budget authority must be
made available for obligation.

Deferrals must be proposed

by the President whenever any Executive action or inaction

effectively precludes the obligation or expenditure of
budget authority.

The President is required to make such

budget authority available for obligation if either House

passes an 'impoundment resolution' disapproving the
45

proposed deferral.

Thus, in 1972, Congress, with an awareness of the

disturbing national fiscal situation and the gross inade-
45

congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act

of .1974, U.S. Code, vol. 31, sections 101.2-1.3.
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quacies of the Congressional budget process, took steps
toward meaningful, permanent reform.

The Joint Study

Committee on Budget Control concluded that Congress should
revamp its budget process to permit an enhancement of its

position in relation to the President and to provide a

mechanism whereby overall fiscal policy decisions could
be made and executed.

The result was the passage in J.974

of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act.

The Act established separate House and Senate Budget
Committees and an independent Congressional Budget Office.
It mandated a new Congressional budget timetable.

Thus,

the intent of the 1974 Budget Act was to provide Congress
with the framework to make budgeting decisions based upon
the budget as a whole.

It represented an attempt to

evaluate the successes and failures of previous Congres
sional endeavors to modify the budget process.

Has the

1974 legislation resulted in a Congressional ability to
determine the government's spending priorities or to set

fiscal policy?

Has Congress been able to effectively

adhere to the newly established Congressional budget
timetable?

These questions will be the subject of the

ensuing chapter 'Implementing the New Procedures.'

CHAPTER III

IMPLEMENTING THE NEW PROCEDURES

The 1974 Budget Act established a complicated
set of procedures for Congress to follow in enacting the
national budget.

If effectively implemented, the Budget

Act could assist Congress in establishing greater control

over the budget totals, improve the assessment of relative
priorities among budget programs, and enhance the legis
lative role in fiscal policy decision making.

However,

the complex and elaborate procedxires were yet to be

tested.

This chapter will examine Congressional imple

mentation of the procedures enacted into law with the
passage of the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act.

The analysis of Congressional implementation

will be accomplished chronologically beginning with the
1975 'trial run' of the new process through the fifth

year of operation - 1979.

Trial Run - 1975

Although the Budget Act was passed in 1974, full
implementation of its provisions did not occur until

Congress considered the fiscal year 1977 budget.

In 1975,

however, several elements of the Act were put into operation
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on a 'trial run' basis.

The Budget Oommittees and Con

gressional leadership, in order to acquaint Congress
with the new procedures, decided to implement major parts
of the Budget Act for fiscal J.976.

The 1975 implemen

tation plan called for enactment of the first and second

budget resolutions.

The first budget resolution setting

spending targets was to be enacted according to the time
table established with passage of the Budget Act.

However,

the first resolution was to contain only five total budget
figures; outlays, budget authority, revenue, deficit and
the amount of the public debt.

The Budget Committee

reports explaining the resolutions would divide the
spending total among the sixteen budget functions.

But

the reports were not to allocate spending totals among
the various Congressional committees with authority over
spending legislation as the Budget Act provided.

The

plan also required the adoption of the second resolution
46

no later than September .15 "if practicable."

Thus,

while the two budget resolutions would be less complete
than those that would follow in latex years, they would
have the same legal force, and would serve to familiarize
Congress with the new procedures.

In its first attempt to enact a first resolution of
the budget. Congress beat the deadline of -May J.5 by one
46
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day.

The new process faced its most serious challenge in

the House, whose membership faces re-election every two

years and seemed less willing than Senators to compromise
their economic beliefs to draw a consensus.

When the

House Budget Committee met to begin preparation of the
first resolution, acting upon the recommendation of
Committee Chairman Brock Adams,(D.) Washington, they

decided that the approach of the House Committee in this
first year would be to simply forecast the spending and
revenue legislation that Congress was likely to adopt
during the legislative session.

This approach was a

conciliatory move designed to neutralize the hostility
of other committees.

The result was that the budget

process had little impact on spending and revenue legis
47

lation in the House in its first year.

House Committee members reviewed the proposed

budget items in great detail, debating the merits of one
program versus another.

The Committee, however, was unable

to arrive at a consensus on the first draft of the first

resolution.

All eight Republicans and three southern

Democrats opposed the deficit of $73.2 billion as being
too large, and they were joined in opposition by two
liberal Democrats who felt that the resolution provided

too much funding for defense and too little for social

^^Havemann, p. 45.
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programs.
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The stalemate was resolved when two Republican

Committee members switched their votes so that the issue

could be acted upon by the entire House.
The first resolution adopted by the House Budget
Committee faced another serious challenge on the House
floor.

There was substantial Republican opposition to the

resolution, led by the ranking minority member of the

House Budget Committee, Delbert L. Latta, (R.) Ohio.

In

the full House vote on the first resolution Hay -1, an

almost solid bloc of Republicans and 35 southern Democrats,

most of whom objected to the size of the deficit, united
with liberal Democrats to nearly defeat the resolution.
The vote was 200-196.

Thus, the reluctance of political

and ideological blocs in the House to compromise their
views nearly wrecked the new budget process.
In contrast to the situation with the House Budget

Committee, the Senate Committee members consciously

attempted to set economic policy and explored the budget
in much less programmatic detail.

Unlike his counterpart

in the House, Senate Budget Committee Chairman Edmund
Muskie, (D.) Maine, was able to gain, early in the process,

the key support of the Senate Budget Committee's ranking
Republican, Henry Bellmon, (R.) Oklahoma, a fiscal con
servative.

The Committee's recommendations for targets

and ceilings were supported by many Senate Republicans,
48
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encouraged by the support of Bellmon and most other
Committee Republicans.

Thus, substantial minority

support, combined with an overwhelming Democratic backing,
allowed the first resolution to pass in the Senate by a
49

comfortable margin.

Differences between the House and

Senate versions of the first resolution were resolved by
a conference committee, composed of members of the two
Budget Committees, without much difficulty.

The reconciled

budget resolution set a total spending target of $367
billion and a budget deficit of $68.8 billion.

This

marked the first time Congress had ever determined

spending levels.
With the spending levels established, Congressional
committees set upon their traditional tasks of acting upon
all budget and spending authority bills.

The responsib

ilities of overseeing that the committees enacted spending
bills within the guidelines established by the first
budget resolution were mainly left to the individual
committees themselves, and the Budget Committees.

Budget

Committee chairmen quickly assumed an active role in the
process, regularly appearing on the House and Senate floors

when spending bills were being debated to notify their
colleagues of the relationship between the bills and the
budget resolution.

In the House, Chairman Adams attempted

to divert committee action which would violate the budget
49
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resolution guidelines.

His staff made efforts to discover

bills in conflict with the targets of the first resolution
before the bills were sent to the House floor.

In contrast.

Senate Chairman Muskie did not hesitate to oppose legis
50

lation on the Senate floor.

In 1975 the passage of the second resolution was

quite different than the 1974 Budget Act provisions.
Congress did not enact the second resolution until Decem
ber 12, nearly three months later than provided in the
Budget Act.

This occurred for several reasons.

The change

of the fiscal year to October 1 was not to occur until
1976, so the 1976 fiscal year had begun on July 1 and it
was impossible to pass the second resolution prior to
the beginning of the fiscal year.

Also, Congress had not

completed work on the regular spending and revenue

legislation by September, since the 1975 partial imple
mentation of the Act did not require the Appropriations
Committees to adhere to their deadlines for the enactment

of spending legislation.

By the time Congress passed the

second resolution the fiscal year was nearly half over,

and hence Congress had little effectiveness in making
meaningful adjustments to the first resolution totals.
The second resolution placed a ceiling of $374.9 billion
51

on spending and a floor of $300,8 billion upon revenues.

^°Havemann, p. 50
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These totals corresponded closely with those of the first

resolution primarily because the spending and revenue
bills which had been enacted met the targets set by the
first resolution.

While the new budget system was not without dif
ficulties in its first year, it appeared to have succeeded

in coordinating spending and revenue legislation within
the framework of over-all goals.

The economy in late

1975 and early 1976 was recovering from recession and
thus actual spending was reduced; even with an additional

emergency appropriation of $2.3 billion in short-term
loans for New York City, actual spending for fiscal 1976
fell below the spending ceiling established by the second

resolution.

Thus, Congress had succeeded in its partial

implementation of the Budget Act provisions.

The Second Year - 1976

As the new budget process began its second year of
operation, it faced a significant challenge - that of

implementing the full package of provisions of the 1974
Budget Act.

The coming fiscal year would be changed from

July 1 to October 1, and Congress would attempt to enact

all spending and revenue legislation prior to that time.
The Congressional authorization committees were required
to be prepared for floor debate of spending bills by

May 15.

The new timetable mandated that the Appropriations

Committees complete action of their massive workload in

48

less time.

The first required action of the new budget process
was the November 10 submittal of the Office of Management

and Budget's current services budget showing the cost of

maintaining all current government services for the next
fiscal year.

Unfortunately, the current services report

was of little usefulness to the Congressional Budget

Committees, since the estimates proved dated and inaccur
^ 52
ate.

In Congress, the first action mandated by the Budget
Act was the submittal, to the Budget Committees by March

15, of the Congressional committee reports.

All committees

were able to comply with the deadline, although the Budget
Committees found themselves examining reports with a

wide variety of interpretations as to what should be
included.

However, without exception the committees

reports took care to include all possible spending programs
that had even a slight chance of enactment.

On March 15

the Congressional Budget Office presented to the Budget
Committees the first annual report of budget options for

the ensuing fiscal year.

Unfortunately, like the 0MB

current services report, the CBO report was deemed too
general by the Budget Committees to serve much usefulness

in making decisions upon specific budget issues.

Thus,

the Budget Committees relied nearly exclusively upon the

^^Havemann, p. 61.
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March J.5 committee reports as informational tools in the

budget process.

May 15 was the deadline established for

committees to report legislation authorizing appropriations
for the next fiscal year.

All the House authorizing com

mittees and nearly all those of the Senate met this dead
line.

Hence, for the first time in many years, the House

and Senate Appropriations Committees were able to begin
action on spending legislation with some indication of the
programs which would be funded by Congress.
Consideration of the first resolution in the House

Budget Committee followed the same pattern as the previous
year.

Chairman Adams presented his proposal for the first

resolution, which included increases in the President's

budget for domestic programs and decreases in defense.
The Budget Committee increased Adams' defense proposal and
added an additional package of domestic programs proposed

by Committee member Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (B.) -Massachu
setts.

The House Budget Committee Republicans held to

gether in solid opposition to the Committee's proposed
first resolution.

Thus, Adams had to gain strong support

from Committee Democrats, which he did and the budget

resolution was sent to the House floor by a vote of
53

14 - 10.^-^

After near defeat, in the House, of the Budget
Committee's resolution in 1975, Chairman Adams approached

^^Havemann, p. 65.
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the 1976 budget process with an overriding concern to
elicit support in the House for the new process.

He

actively sought the support of House Republicans and
coininittee chairmen.

His efforts paid off when the House
54

passed the first budget resolution with a 66 vote margin.
In the Senate, Chairman Huskie came face to face

with finance Committee Chairman Russell Long,(D.) Louisiana,
over the Finance Committee's tax bill.

The Senate Budget

Committee debated a first resolution which included

$2 billion in revenue to be collected by eliminating tax
expenditures.

When Senator Long voiced his opposition to

this part of the resolution as exceeding the jurisdiction
of the Budget Committee, -Muskie replied that "it was
perfectly within the Committee's jurisdiction to make
recommendations on such broad issues as the size of a tax
55

cut and the magnitude of tax reform."

The Senate

Budget Committee version of the first resolution was
similar to that of the House Committee.

The Senate Com

mittee sided with Chairman Muskie on the issue of the

$2 billion tax reform.

The full Senate easily passed the

Committee version of the first resolution by a 62 ^ 22 vote,
The minor differences between the House and Senate versions

of the first resolution were quickly reconciled by the
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the conference committee.

Thus, in the second year of

implementation of the Budget Act, the budget procedures
appeared to be establishing themselves in Congress.

The

final vote on the first resolution was taken on May 13,
two days prior to the May 15 deadline.
With the passage of the first resolution. Congress
embarked upon action on spending and revenue bills.

In

the House, Chairman Adams, encouraged by House support of
the budget resolution, adopted a more active role than 1975
in making the targets of the first resolution hold.

He

tried to enforce the resolution by encouraging several
committees and subcommittees to enact cost-cutting legis
lation.

The majority of the cost-cutting items had been

proposed in the March 15 reports by committees which
desired to trim spending.

However, in two cases Adams

pushed for the legislation which would trim spending.

The

first case involved the repeal of the "1-percent kicker,"
a provision which gave retired Federal workers an additional

1-percent increase in their pension benefits with, each
cost-of-living raise.

The second target was a spending

limit on highway construction.

The House Appropriations

Committee, with the support of the House Budget Committee,
had included a $7.2 billion outlay ceiling for highway
construction.

When Representative James J. Howard, (F.)

New Jersey, chairman of the House Public Works and Trans
portation Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, proposed
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an araendiQent on the House floor to delete the ceiling,
the House supported the amendment.

However, the Senate

included a ceiling in its version of the transportation
appropriations bill.

When the bill went to a conference

committee of House and Senate Appropriations Committee
members, Adams pushed for inclusion of the ceiling and
., 56

was successful.

In the Senate, Chairman Huskie continued his battle
with the Finance Committee and its tax bill.

The tax bill

reported to the Senate floor included marginal reform and
provided for tax cut extensions only for nine months of

fiscal 1977.

Huskie did not hesitate in challenging the

bill on the Senate floor as being a serious violation of
the first budget resolution.

However, when JHuskie and

Senator Henry Bellmon, the ranking Republican on the
Senate Budget Committee, tried to increase the tax cut

to make it conform with their interpretation of the budget
57

resolution, they were defeated by a 49 - 42 vote.

Unlike 1975, adherance to the budget timetable and

prompt action on the spending and tax bills enabled the

Budget Committees to prepare the second budget resolution
on schedule.

Congress had completed nine of its thirteen

regular appropriations bills and action on the other four

^^Havemann, pp. 70-2.
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was near completion by the b.udget deadline of seven days
after Labor Day.

The legislation enacted during the

summer was close to the targets of the first resolution.

Thus, the Budget Committees wrote a second resolution
nearly identical to that of the first.

The second res

olution was quickly passed by both Houses, a conference
committee reconciled the two versions, the Senate adopted
the conference report on September 15, the deadline set

by the Budget Act, and the House adopted it one day later.
Despite the relative ease with which the Congress
had enacted the second resolution, it proved not to be
the end of the fiscal 1977 budget cycle.

The economy had

slumped, a new President had been elected and Congress,
upon convening in January 1977,set about preparation of

a third budget resolution.

The House Budget Committee,

under the leadership of its new chairman, Bobert Giaimo,

(D.y Connecticut, began consideration of ten proposals
designed to stimulate the economy.

The Senate Budget

Committee, proceeding in a typical manner, considered the
President's proposals for economic stimulation and the

package prepared by Senate Republicans.

elicited discussion of fiscal policy.

These proposals

The result was

the passage of the third budget resolution on Harch 3,
1977.

But this action was not to be the end of the

matter.

Soon after adoption of the third resolution.
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President Carter withdrew support of the proposal which

would have given a $50 rebate to individual taxpayers,
stating the economy was improving on its own.

0MB

reported that fiscal 1977 outlays were less than estimated.
Hence, the third resolution's revenue total was $10

billion lower than necessary and the outlay total was $9
billion too large.

The Budget Committees combined a

revised third resolution with the reporting of the first
resolution for fiscal 1978, and this fourth resolution was
adopted when Congress approved the first resolution for

fiscal 1978.

Thus, the fiscal 1977 budget cycle finally

was completed on May 17, 1977, more than a full year after
adoption of the first resolution for fiscal 1977.

The Third Year - 19.77

1977 proved to be a disturbing year for the budget
process. Problems with the budget timetable began to
become evident in 1977 and 1978.

A serious problem was

recognized in the deadlines established by the budget
process for authorization and appropriations bills.

While

the deadlines caused friction between the Appropriations
Committees and the authorizing committees, this had been
a recurring problem prior to enactment of the 1974 Act.

For years, the Appropriations Committees had complained

that they had to postpone action while they were waiting
for the authorizing committees to enact legislation.

The

problem was aggravated by the Budget Act's establishment
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of tight deadlines for final action on appropriations bills,
Hence the Appropriation Coramittee claimed they could not

meet the deadlines because the authorizing committees
acted too slowly.

The result was that often the Appro

priations Committees approved spending for unauthorized
programs, much to the dismay of the authorization and
Budget Committees.
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On the other hand the authorization committees
found the March 15 deadline for submission of advance es

timates of outlays and budget authority for the next
fiscal year too stringent.

Also, although the authorizing

committees had generally been able to meet the May J.5
deadline for reporting bills to Congress, Congress had
been slow to enact authorization legislation.

Thus, when

appropriations bills came up for consideration in the House
in mid-June many of the authorization measures were still

to be enacted.

The absence of sufficient authorizing

legislation left but two choices to the Appropriations
Committees. They could leave gaping holes in their bills
or they could elect to ignore the absence of authorizing
legislation and appropriate funds regardless, which
would in essence render the authorization process mean
ingless.

As in the previous years, once Congress had estab
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lished the budget resolution targets, the responsibility
of enforcing them was thrust upon the Budget Committees.
Senator Henry Bellmon, the ranking Republican on the
Senate Budget Committee, summarized action in the

Senate by stating that the Budget Committee lost more

significant tests of the budget process in .1977 than in
59

the previous two years.

Senate Budget Chairman Muskie

pointed out that on 11 key votes in 1977 in which Congress
sional budget guidelines were at stake, the Senate voted
against the budget eight times.

Muskie stated that only

fifteen Senators had voted for the budget more often
60

than against it.

The third year of the new budget process in the

Senate was dominated by a battle between the Budget Com

mittee and the Finance Committee.

After passage of the

second budget resolution, the Senate Finance Committee
reported an energy tax bill to the Senate floor.

While

the bill contained no new taxes, it provided deductions
and credits to encourage energy conservation.

The Senate

Budget Committee calculated that the bill would leave
Federal revenue for fiscal 1978 some $800 million below

the lower limit of $397 billion that Congress had approved
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with passage of the second budget resolution.

The bill

conflicted with two provisions of the Budget Act.

The

Act prohibits legislation which would reduce the revenue

below the level approved in the second budget resolution,
and also provides that bills initiating entitlement
programs be routed to the Appropriations Committees for

possible amending.

In order to evade the possible ruling

of the bill as violating the Budget Act, the Finance Com
mittee included in the bill a provision which directed the
Secretary of the Treasury to postpone the effective dates

of the revenue-losing sections in order to maintain the

total 1978 fiscal revenue level as established by the
budget resolution.

Chairman jyiuskie regarded the Finance

Committee action as a flagrant violation of the Budget
Act provisions.

The Senate approved the bill after tbe

measure had been amended to bring the revenue—losing
provisions within $300 million of the budget resolution

floor.

The Appropriations Committee, after becoming

aware of the entitlements in the Finance Committee's

bill, met and voted to seek removal of the entitlements

from the energy tax bill.

However, the Committee lost on

the Senate floor by a 30 - 47 vote.

Thus, Finance Chair

man Russell Long had succeeded in gaining Senate approval

of a bill which violated two provisions of the Budget Act.
6ZL

Joel Havemann, "Trimming the 'Thanksgiving
Turkey'," National Journal 9(November 5, 1977); 3.733.
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The Senate Budget Committee also challenged the
Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee over

a costly farm bill.

The Budget Committee challenged the

bill on the grounds that it was $700 nillion higher than
the level permitted by the second budget resolution.

For

the first time the Budget Act's reconciliation process was

operationalized with the Agriculture Committee being
required to report a new bill reducing spending to the
level allowed in the second resolution.

However, the

Agriculture Committee was able to amend the budget resol
ution on the Senate floor thereby escaping the reconciliation
process.

Thus, 1977 was marked by a disturbing trend of

Congress to disregard the Budget Act provisions, and a

year of frustration for both the House and Senate Budget
Committees,

The Fourth Year - 1978

Senate Budget Committee Chairman Muskie remarked

in March, .1978, "I am not sure how long this budget process
62

is going to survive this kind of situation."

Muskie was

referring to the tendency, begun in 1977, for Congress to
disregard the Budget Act provisions.

In March, 1978 the

Senate debated an emergency farm bill which combined

three possibly inconsistent approaches to increased
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benefits for farmers.

Muskie felt the bill was not

understandable and he complained that the hasty passage of

the bill by the Senate on March 21 precluded any examin
ation of its budgetary impacts.

However, 1978 would prove

to be a year when the budget process indisputably influ
enced the spending and tax legislation that Congress

enacted.

By the end of the budget process cycle, Muskie,

in contrast to his earlier remarks, would claim, "I am

much more hopeful now that the budget process is really
63

taking hold in this Congress."

Passage of the first budget resolution proceeded

in a fairly typical manner.

The House Budget Committee

approved budget targets which were nearly identical to
those recommended by Chairman Robert Giaimo.

The first

challenge to Giaimo's recommendations was a proposal by
Committee Republicans to enact a smaller Social Security
tax cut than the chairman recommended.

This proposal

suffered defeat at Committee hands, as did a similar

Republican move for a larger overall reduction in revenues
Giaimo's spending recommendations included increased

spending over the President's budget for agriculture,

coimnerce and housing credit, education, employment,social
service programs, veteran's benefits, and transportation.
He proposed reductions from the President in defense and
interest costs.

Ibid.

Despite criticism from a number of
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Republicans concerning the public service employment

programs, the only major spending change in Giaimo's

recommendations, which were approved by the Committee,

involved an additional $2.5 billion in budget authority
and $.3 billion in outlays for accelerated public works.
The Committee version of the first resolution proved
to be quite controversial when presented for action to

the full House.

The House overruled the Budget Committee

by endorsing the concept of tuition tax credits for parents
with children in elementary and secondary schools and in
college.

Veterans' Affairs Committee Chairman Ray Roberts

(X).) Texas managed to increase the Budget Committee's
recommendations for veterans' programs by $1.1 billion in

budget authority and $844 million in outlays, over the

strong opposition of Budget Chairman Giaimo.

The strongest

challenge to the Committee recommendations came from House

Republicans and was aimed at the Committee targets.

Rep

resentative Marjorie Holt (R.) Maryland proposed an amend
ment to reduce the budget authority target by $21.4 billion,

the outlays target by $13.1 billion, and the revenue

ceiling by $3.2 billion, resulting in a deficit some $9.9

billion below the level proposed by the Budget Committee.
The amendment received overwhelming Republican support with
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but one Republican defector, and some 58 Democrats joined
them in a vote which spelled a very narrow defeat of the

measure, 197 - 203.^^
The Senate Budget Committee followed a slightly
different procedure in drafting their first resolution
targets than did their counterpart

in the House.

The

Senate Committee divided each function into a number of

"missions," and each mission into a number of "issues."

The Committee then decided on each issue and added up the
resulting totals to arrive at mission figures which cor
responded to the functional categories of the budget

resolution.

In addition to the fiscal 1979 targets,

the Senate Committee also considered the five-year
implications of various decisions.

The Senate Budget Committee approved the tuition
tax credit over the vehement objections of chairman

Muskie.

Muskie argued successfully against the use of

general revenues to finance the Social Security system.
The Senate Budget Committee position on these two con

troversial tax issues was diametrically opposite from the
position adopted by the House Committee.

When the full

Senate debated the Committee's proposals for budget
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targets for fiscal 1979, they approved a first resolution

which set spending and revenue targets identical to the
Conntiittee's recoraraendations, a solid victory for the
Senate Coinmittee and its chairman, Edmund Muskie.

The

only challenge to the Committee's recommendations which

came close to gaining Senate approval were proposals by
Senators McGovern, (D.) South Dakota, and Eagleton, (D.)

Missouri, to cut spending targets for national defense.
Thus, there were indications at the outset of the 1978

budget year of the growing strength of the Budget Commit
tees.

The budget compromise drafted by the conference

committee was approved within two days of the May 15
deadline set by the Budget Act.

The Senate approved the

first resolution May 12 with a voice vote; the House
followed May 17 with a 201 - -198 vote.

When President

Carter and Congress agreed to reduce the administration's

proposed tax cut and delay its effective date by three

months, final approval of the first resolution in Congress
was encouraged.

The Budget Committees, in analyzing the

President's proposed $25 billion tax cut had warned that

it would be more effective and less inflationary for the
government to concentrate efforts instead, upon programs

to eliminate structural unemployment.

Senate Committee

Chairman Muskie and House Committee Chairman Giaimo met

with President Carter, with the result being the new
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agreement on fiscal policy.

Por the first time in the

new budget process. Congress had succeeded in influencing
the spending and tax legislation.
Once again the Budget Committees set about their
task of ensuring that Congress adhered to the first res

olution budget targets when it acted upon spending and
revenue legislation.

Especially in the Senate, the Budget

Committees succeeded in enforcing the budget targets on
any number of issues.

An example of this is shown with

the tuition tax credit bill.

The Senate Finance Committee

had prepared a bill to provide a tax credit of up to $500
a year for families of elementary, secondary and college
students.

The complicated provisions of the bill required

waivers irom three provisions of the Budget Act, and the

section of the bill providing cash refunds for the poor
had to be reviewed by the Appropriations Committee.

The

Senate Budget Committee refused to approve the waivers and

the Appropriations Committee voted against the refunds.
Thus, the Finance Committee was forced to rewrite the

bill removing the disallowed sections and cutting the cost
of the bill by $2.3 billion.

Finance Committee Chairman

Long tried to reinsert the sections through an amendment,
but was voted down handily by the Senate.

He then proposed

to suspend the Budget Act in order to pass his amendment,
and was again voted down.
67
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The Senate Budget Coraraittee also succeeded in

reducing the impact aid program which provides Federal aid
to school districts where many students have parents who
either live on Federal land or who work for the Federal

government.

Senators Thomas Eagleton and Henry Bellmon

offered a bill to remove students whose parents are merely
employed by the Federal government from inclusion in the
program, but were defeated 20 - 66.

However, Bellmon

then proposed to eliminate a provision which forced the
Appropriations Committee to allot funds to all other kinds
of school districts before it reserves funds for the

neediest districts- those

with many parents who live on

Federal property and pay no property tax.

Bellmon*s
68

proposal was enacted by the Senate by a 57 - 35 vote.

Both

Budget Committees, were victorious dxiring the

debate of legislation authorizing loans to the Witteveen
Financing Facility of the International Monetary Fund,
which is designed to supply loans to countries with large
trade deficits.

The House Budget Committee persuaded the

Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee to amend the

bill to require Congressional action on annual appropri
ations before providing any funds to the Witteveen unit.
.

■
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A similar successful amendment was passed in the Senate.

^^Ibid., pp. 1502-3.
^^Ibid., p. 1503.
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The House approved by a 2J.7 - -178 margin the
second resolution of the budget.

In doing so, the House

passed a resolution nearly the same as the Budget Commit
tee recommendation.

This second resolution lowered the

spending ceiling some $9 billion below the level approved
by the House in the first budget resolution.

Budget

Chairman Giaimo estimated that $5.5 billion of the dif
ference reflected lower estimates of the program costs,

and about $2.5 billion reflected Congressional decisions
to reduce expected spending.

In the Senate, the second budget resolution received

easy approval on September 6.

As in the House, the second

resolution spending totals were lower by some $9.3
billion than the first resolution

figures.

After passage

of the second resolution, Muskie stated, "This second

budget resolution is...a signal to our citizens and to

the private economy that the Federal government will lead
the way toward reducing inflation without sacrificing
jobs."
The House and Senate conference committee was

not able to arrive at a compromised version of the second

budget resolution until September 21.

Congress did not
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complete action setting binding totals for spending and
revenues until September 23 with Senate approval of the

conference version of the second resolution.

The budget

conference committee had been delayed by a dispute over
public works spending.

Both the House and Senate had

included President Carter's labor-intensive public works
legislation in the first budget resolution totals.

However,

the Saiate Budget Committee had reversed itself and opposed

the program later in the year stating that declining un
employment and accelerating inflation made the reduction
of the deficit more important.

When the House conferees

insisted upon inclusion of the public works program in
the second resolution, Muskie requested a Senate vote on
that specific line item and succeeded.

The conference

committee was then hopelessly deadlocked over the public

works issue until Muskie proposed a solution.

He proposed

that the conferees accept the Senate combined budget
figure for public works and disaster relief, which the
Senate could interpret as involving no funding for public

works and a $1.2 billion funding for disaster relief.
The House, on the other hand, could interpret the action

as including $700 million for public works and some $430
72

million for disaster relief.

With sucK ambiguity, the

second resolution establishing binding totals for spending
"Fiscal 1979 Ceiling; $487.5 Billion Budget
Compromise Approved," Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report 36(September 23, 1978): 2585.
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and revenues was finally adopted on September 23, some
eight days beyond the deadline set by the Budget Act.

But

this was not yet the end to action on the fiscal .1979
budget.

In May, 1979 Congress had to revise the 1979

second resolution figures due to higher than expected
costs and various supplemental appropriations.

This was

accomplished with the passage of the first budget resolution
for fiscal 1980.

Nevertheless, 1978 proved to be a good

year for the Congressional budget process.

Senate Budget

Committee Chairman Muskie, who in March had doubted the

survivability of the budget process, in September remarked,
"I am much more hopeful now that the budget process is
73

really taking hold in this Congress."

The Pifth Year" - 1979

The most serious challenges to the Congressional
budget process were to occur in 1979.

The year was to be

marked by an ever-increasing desire of Congress to cut
spending and move toward a balanced Federal budget.

Com

bined with the faltering economy of .1979 was President
Carter's pledge to restrain the Federal deficit below

$30 billion.

Hence, after but four years of existence

the House and Senate Budget Committees found themselves
encountering the major domestic policy battle of 1979
the budget conflict.
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Budget activities began in the Senate with the
presentation in March of a proposal designed to break the
deadlock on legislation to increase the limit on the
public debt.

The proposal, drafted by Pinance Committee

Chairman Long, Budget Chairman Muskie, and Senator Bob
Packwood, (R.) Oregon, would require the Budget Committees
to report on April .15, .1979 a balanced budget for fiscal

1981 and 1982, and to explain the effects of balancing
the budget on revenues, spending, employment, inflation

and national security.

The proposal would further require

the Budget Committees to report balanced first resolutions
for fiscal 1981 and 1982.

The proposal, which was offered

as an alternative to a series of balanced budget amend
ments, was approved by Congress on April 2.
When the House Budget Committee began preparation
of the first budget resolution in 1979, it did so without
recommendations from Committee Chairman Giaimo.

Instead,

Giaimo summoned Committee Democrats into a caucus which

met to prepare recommendations.

This approach was utilized

to involve Committee Democrats in a majority building
effort.

The first resolution recommended by the House

Budget Committee cut the Federal deficit to below $25

billion by cutting defense spending and eliminating the
general revenue sharing for the states.

In addition, the

Committee's recommendations restored some of the Pres

ident's proposed cuts in jobs, education, health, and
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.
74
social service programs.

Passage of the first Ixudget resolution in the
House proved particularly vexing in 1979.

House leaders

had scheduled debate on the Budget Committee's recom
mended targets for three days, but it took nine days of
debate before the House approved a first resolution.

The

House had considered nearly 40 floor amendments, prompting
Representative Morris Udall (D.l Arizona to term tlie
House, a 'fast breeder reactor for amendments.'

Udall

commented that "Every morning when I come to my office,
I find there are 20 new amendments.

We dispose of 20 or
75

25 amendments, and it breeds 20 more amendments."

Despite the length of the House debate, the Budget
Committee was generally successful in the floor battles.
The House voted to reject Republican plans to further cut
the proposed deficit some $4.9 billion and defeated a
measure which would have enacted tax cuts in -1979 and

1980.

The House rejected a bid by liberal Democrats to

transfer funds from defense to various domestic programs.
The first resolution, which, the House approved, contained
the Budget Committee recommendation to eliminate funds

for revenue sharing for the states.

The House did approve
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a last-jninute amendment by Representative Joseph
Fisher (R.) Virginia which enacted an across-the-board
spending cut of .5 percent.
The Senate Budget Committee began deliberating for
the first time under the provisions of the new three-

year budget procedure established by the debt limit
legislation.

The Senate Committee concluded that Congress

could either balance the budget or cut taxes in fiscal
3.982, but not both actions.

The Committee recommended

balancing the budget and postponing action of the tax cut
until 1982.

In addition, tbe Committee made recommendations

for the fiscal 1980 first resolution which slashed spending
to a level below that of President Carter and the House
Committee recommendations.

On April 25 the Senate approved a three-year

spending plan which was essentially the same as the policy
recommendations of the Budget Committee.

Under the

provisions of the new debt limit law, the Senate had the
option of following the Committee's recommendation of
balancing the budget in 1981 and reserving a tax cut for
1982, or enacting the alternative plan.

However, the

Senate never considered the alternative.

House and Senate conferees were able to agree -May
18 to a first resolution which reduced the Federal deficit
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to $23 billion and set the stage for a balanced budget
in 1981.

As usual, the conference was dominated by the

debate over the relative levels of spending for defense

and domestic programs.

The conferees were able to agree

to a proposal which split their differences.

However,

when the conference version of the first resolution

returned to the House floor for approval, it was

defeated by a wide margin on the grounds that the totals
provided too rniuch funding for defense and too little for

"function 500" which includes funds for education, training,
employment and social services programs.

With the defeat

of the conference totals. House conferees proposed a $200
million cut in defense and a $50 million cut in inter
national relations, with a $300 million increase in

function 500.

The Senate refused to compromise defense

funding and instead proposed a $350 million increase in

function 500 only.

And it was thus that Congress was final

ly able to pass a first budget resolution on May 24, nine
77

days past the Budget Act deadline.

By mid-summer economic experts were raising estimates

of inflation and unemployment and were forecasting a
recession.

With the dim economic news in the forefront,

the Senate Budget Committee met in late July to begin
preparation of the second resolution.
77

Chairman Muskie

.

Christopher R. Conte, "Budgeti' Liberals Porce

Social Spending Hike," Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report 37CMay 26, 1979)_; 996.

72

informed the Committee that Vmany Senate committees have
failed to meet the first budget resolution mandate to make

savings and economies."

Further, Muskie warned that the

appropriations process might add an additional $2 billion
in outlays to the first resolution figure.

In a precedent-

setting action, the Senate Committee voted to order the
six legislative committees in question to make cuts as

necessary to bring the programs within the first resolution
targets.

This recommendation of reconciliation

would not

be made binding unless the full Senate and House granted

its approval and made it a part of the second budget
resolution.

The Committee modified spending totals in

its second resolution recommendations to correspond to the

uncontrollable economy-related spending increases.

The Senate approved a second budget resolution
which included large increases in the defense budget for
the next three years.

Th_e reconciliation issue had been

resolved, in favor of the

Budget Committee, when key

committee chairmen had agreed to cut some $3.6 billion
of the $4 billion which the Budget Committee had insisted
upon cutting.

The compromise left the committees a degree

of freedom to determine which of the programs would be

reduced.

The agreement permitted a 30 day period during

which the
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committees were required to make the cuts.
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The House Budget Coraraittee did not report its
version of the second resolution to the full House until

September 14.

The House Committee had retreated from

taking reconciliation action against House committees, as
had their Senate counterpart.

The resolution reported by

the House Committee made few substantive policy changes
from the first resolution, although the spending figure
was some $17 billion greater than that of the first res
olution, mainly due to the altered economic outlook and
cost re-estimates.

When the House attempted to pass the second resol

ution, it was surprisingly rejected.

The lateness of the

hour, a breakdown in order, and the unexpected swiftness

with which the resolution moved through the House all
79

contributed to the defeat.

A second attempt at passage

of the second resolution succeeded on September 27 by

a slim 6-vote margin.
When the House and Senate Budget conferees met to
resolve the second budget resolution, they found themselves
faced with a monximental task.

Billions of dollars which

the Senate had targeted for defense spending and similar
amounts which the House reserved for social programs
separated the conferees.

In addition, they were divided

on the issues of reconciliation and multi-year budgeting.
Hence, it took the conferees a total of 23 days to draft

^^Ibid., p. 180.
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a compxamise second resolution.

The compromise set a

$29.8 billion budget deficit and provided for both in
creased defense and social spending.

The compromise

resolution also contained instructions to six authorizing

committees to cut $1.8 billion from already passed legis
lation and ordered House and Senate Appropriations Com
mittees to reduce 1980 spending by $2.55 billion.

The

House conferees opposed the reconciliation provision,
,
80
however.

The budget debate was not to be resolved yet.

The

House and Senate agreed with the budget ceilings set by the

conference committee, but the House refused to agree to the
reconciliation process incorporated into the resolution.
The second budget resolution was not to be enacted in
1979 until November 28.

The final version was fashioned

when the Senate agreed to a reconciliation issue comprom
ise, which replaced the formal enforcement orders with a

warning that Congress would not bail out committees that
OT

failed to meet their spending limits.
Thus, after four years of existence, in 1.979, the
budget process found itself embroiled in the battle of the

budget.

With the mounting inflation and a strong pos

sibility of a recession, the Congressional policy-makers
80
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recognized the budget as providing a useful mechanism
for setting spending and revenue priorities.

If five years

of the budget process had demonstrated anything, it was

the key role that politics played in the process, and the
overwhelming determination of the Budget Committees'

chairmen to make the process viable.

Both are key

factors in analyzing the effectiveness of the process,
as the subsequent chapter will demonstrate.

CHAPTER IV

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONS

To achieve the objectives of the 1974 Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act, the House and Senate

Budget Committees, and the Congressional Budget Office
were established.

In drafting the Budget Act the sponsors

took care in establishing Budget Committees strong

enough to implement the new budget procedures.

At the

same time, the Budget Committees were established so as
not to conflict with the existing Congressional structure.

Generally, the Budget Committees have proven to be
neither omnipotent nor powerless.

While the 1974 Act

established identical duties for both the House Budget

Committee and the Senate Budget

Committee, the two

Committees have differed greatly in their approach,

reflecting their different rules and politics of the
house.

Generally, it has been observed that the House

Budget Committee has been weaker, and that the budget
process itself has been characterized by a greater degree
of partisanship in the House.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was estab
lished by the 1974 Act to supply Congress with the

budgetary information necessary to implement the new
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budget process.

In drafting the 1974 Act, the House version

provided for the establishment of a joint Budget Committee
staff to prepare budget estimates.

The Senate pressed for

a CEO that would provide budget estimates and also policy

analyses, studies of the pros and cons of alternative pol
icies.

The Senate won the battle and appointed Dr. Alice

Rivlin as director of the CBO.

From the outset, the Budget Committees and the
CBO have performed essential roles in the implementation
of the Budget Act.

In this chapter, the effectiveness

of these institutions will be examined.

Specifically,

the analysis will focus upon the jnany factors which have
acted to influence the effectiveness of each of these

institutions in performing their respective functions.
Discussion will be limited to effectiveness as it relates

to the budget process, rather than the effectiveness of

the Budget Act in meeting its objectives, which will be
covered in the concluding chapter of this study.

House Budget Committee

The House Budget Committee has operated quite dif
ferently from its counterpart in the Senate.

One of the

major factors which- has influenced the effectiveness of
the House Budget Committee is the nature of the House

itself.

Because they face re-election every two years.

Representatives seem less willing to compromise their

political and ideological views for the sake of th,e budget
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process.

This has made the nature of the budget process

in the House one of partisan politics.

House Republicans

have consistently refused to support the Budget Committee
through almost the entire history of the new process.
Unable to rely upon any Republican support for the Congres

sional budget in the House, the House Budget Committee
has been forced to build a majority exclusively within

the Democratic party.

And that has required that conces

sions be made to Democratic liberals, who have consistently

pressed for increases in social spending.

Early in the

budget process. House Budget Committee leadership

recognized that there were two kinds of resolutions which
the full House would approve: conservative ones supported

by Republicans and conservative and moderate Democrats,
and more liberal ones backed by moderate and liberal

Democrats.

They rejected the former option, which was

similar to the course followed in the Senate, and attempted
82

the latter.

Another factor which influenced the effectiveness

of the House Budget Committee was the make-up of the
Committee itself.

Under the rules, of the J.974 Budget Act,

the House Budget Committee was to consist of 23 members,
whn would be limited to serving no more than four years in

any ten year period.

In addition. Title I of the Budget

Act specified that the Committee would include: five
82
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members from the House Appropriations Committee; five
members from the House Ways and 24eans Committee; eleven

members from other standing committees; one member from

the leadership of the minority party; and one member from
83

the leadership of the majority party.

The rules were

modified when Committee membership was expanded to

twenty—five members in 1975, with thirteen members
selected from standing House committees.

In 1.978, the

House agreed to a change in the length of the term for
the Committee members; the term was extended from four
to six years.

Observers agree that the membership rules in the
House have weakened that chamber's Committee, making it

less independent of the other spending and tax committees
84

and oi the House leadership.

With twelve members of

the Budget Committee also serving other powerful House

committees, the Committee was restricted from developing
too much power of its own.

One House Committee staffer

stated that the House feared that the Budget Committee

would become a 'super committee' and hence the House rules

establishing the Budget Committee differed significantly
85

from those of the Senate.

The result was that the

^^Congressional Budget and rmpoundment Control Act
of X974, U.S. Code, volume 3d., section 101 C1974).

®'^Conte, "Budget Committees at Center of Crucial
2979 Policy Fight," p. 27.

^^Telephone Interview with Bosalee N. Roberts,
Budget Assistant to Congressman Bill Nelson, Washington,
D.C., 29 February 2980.
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Coininittee members representing the other powerful legis
lative committees attempted to ensure that the Budget
Committee didn't become a power center in the House.

Neal Smith (D.) Iowa of the Appropriations Committee

fought a generally losing battle to keep the Budget
Committee from recommending spending targets for

individual appropriations accounts. Otis G. Pike
CD.) New York of the Ways and Means Committee
helped keep the Budget Committee from proposing

specific tax policy in its third resolution for
fiscal 1977.®^
Thus, the House Budget Committee often acted as an agent

for the other powerful House committees, sometimes the

Appropriations Committee and other times the Democratic
leadership.

By limiting the length of time a member could
serve on the House Budget Committee, the House lessened

the importance of such a Committee assignment.

The

chairman was unable to use the Committee to develop a

permanent power base in the House.

The mandatory

rotation of members discouraged the development of exper

tise among Committee members. Delfaert Latta, the Commit
tee's Republican leader, stated, "Many Committee members
feel, "This is a temporary assignment, so why should I
87

give it my full time?'."

Hence, the House Budget Com

mittee was restricted from developing into the kind of

independent force within the House due, in large part, to
86
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the rules establishing the Budget Committee.
The chairmen of the Budget Committees developed

quite distinctive approaches to Congressional budget
making in their respective houses.

Following passage of

the Budget Act, in the summer of 1974, Representatives
and Senators had to choose members and chairmen for the

new Budget Committees.

In the House, Democrats caucused

to elect the Budget Committee chairman.

The candidates

included Brock Adams, a liberal, and A1 Ullraan CD.)

Oregon, the second-ranking Democrat on the Ways and Heans
Committee.

Representative Ullman defeated Adams and

served as Budget Committee chairman until the end of 1974
when he replaced Wilbur Mills as chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee.

The caucus then selected Representative
88

Adams to replace Ullman as Budget Committee chairman.
Ullman had served in the House for eighteen years in

contrast to his successor. Brock Adams, who had been in the

House for but ten years.

The only prior committee chair

manship experience which Adams possessed was as the
chairman of a subcommittee of the District of Columbia

Committee.

Hence, the House operated at some disadvantage

from the outset.

The approach developed by Chairman Adams in the
House Budget Committee was in great contrast to that of
his counterpart in the Senate, Edmund Muskie.

Adams was

reluctant to risk the Committee's reputation in a floor
88
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fight over spending or tax issues.

He decided that he

could be most effective by working behind the scenes, with
the House committees.89

Representative Robert Giaimo

succeeded Adams as chairman of the Budget Committee in

1977.

Giaimo had served eighteen years in the House,

but had not served as a committee chairman.

Giaimo

continued the basic approach of operating behind the
scenes, which Adams had developed.

Thus, neither Adams

nor Giaimo had experience dealing with powerful House
committee chairmen who treated them with deference.

This

was an important factor in the effectiveness of the House

chairmen in the development of the majority for adoption
and implementation of the budget resolutions.

After five years of existence, the House Budget
Committee seems to have gained the acceptance of most of
the other Congressional committees.

Adams, chairman of

the House Budget Committee in the first years, made a
concerted effort to enlist the support of the committee

which was likely to resent the new power base of the

Budget Committee, the Appropriations Committee. Represen
tative George Mahon, (D.) Texas, chairman of the House

Appropriations Committee, at the outset issued a warning
to the Budget Committee not to usurp the functions of the

Appropriations Committee. Adams took several steps to
89
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ensure tJie loyalty of the Appropriations Committee and
Chairman Mahon.

He faithfully enforced the Budget Act's

prohibitions against any new 'backdoor spending.'

The

House Budget Committee also attempted to work for reduc
tions in spending for programs which the Appropriations
90

Committee had also sought.

The House Budget Committee had several clashes with
the Ways and Means Committee.

The major dispute between

the two committees occurred in early -1976, as Representative
Corman, (D.) California, chairman of the Unemployment

Compensation Subcommittee, attempted to pass a bill which
would extend unemployment benefits and increase unemploy

ment tax paid by employers.

the provision of

This bill conflicted with

the Budget Act which forbids action on

spending legislation prior to the passage of the first
budget resolution.

The Budget Committee was successful in

delaying action on the measure until that summer.
Another factor which has influenced the effective

ness of the House Budget Committee has been the nature of

the Committee's budget review.

The House Committee has

tended to labor through the budget item by item, which has
elicited the criticism of Congress.

^°Ibid., p. 1350.
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The House Budget Committee was convinced that its

approach was the only way to prepare a Congressional
budget. Adams said there was no way to decide how
much money the government shotild spend in total
without asking how much it should spend for the
programs that make up that total.
The House Appropriations Committee was particularly
critical of the Budget Committee's approach.

House Appropriations Chairman Jamie L. Whitten,
(D.) Mississippi, stated, "We are greatly distressed
about the increasing tendency of the Budget Commit
tee to construct their recommendations for overall

aggregate targets on the basis of individual program
line items.

While line item recommendations in the

budget resolution process have no actual effect,
they obscure the overall macroeconomic responsibil
ities of the Budget Committee and needlessly duplicate
the hearings and deliberations that are the responsi
bility of the authorizing and appropriating commit
tees
I am afraid we are losing sight of the basic

objective of the Budget Act."
Many conservatives expressed a similar frustration with
the Budget Committee in the House.

Representative Latta,

the ranking Republican on the House Budget Committee,
expressed the belief of many House Republicans when he
stated that "the Committee acted like an adding machine
93

without a subtract button."

Instead of setting overall

fiscal guidelines, the Budget Committee was criticized
for simply adding up individual line items.

However, the

political situation in the House mandated that the Budget
93.
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Conmiittee adopt an approach which would yield adopted

budget resolutions. Hence, the House Budget Committee
has been compelled to take action which was bound to

make it unpopular within the different factions of the
House.

Senate Budget Committee

The major factor which has influenced the abilities
of the Senate Budget Committee has been the bipartisan

support which the Senate has proffered. In contrast to
the House, the Senate Budget Committee was to consist of
fijfteen members chosen by the Democratic and Republican

caucuses, as were all other committees.

Additionally,

the Senate established permanent Budget Committee member

ship. The Senate Committee was open for membership to
all Senators whose party leadership would appoint them

to a seat. Thus, membership on the Senate Budget Comrait

tee was regarded as valuable as was evidenced by the
fact that twenty-seven of the Senate's forty-two Repub

licans applied for the six Republican seats on the Budget
Committee. With six Republicans serving on the Commit

tee, the Committee did not develop the partisan division
vihich characterized the House Committee.

The Senate

Republicans were able to form a powerful alliance with
southern Democrats which led to the bipartisanship which
characterized the Senate Committee.

Thus, the Senate
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Caramittee was able to consistently coimnand support for

the budget resolutions developed by the Coiimiittee in
the full Senate, as the previous chapter has demonstrated.

A very significant influence in the effectiveness
of the Senate Budget Committee has been the first and,

until early 1980, the only chairman of the Committee,
Senator Edmund Muskie.

Senator Huskie was an aggressive

Senator who had been a candidate for vice president in
1.968 and a candidate for the Democratic Presidential

nomination in 1972.

Muskie, who at the time of his

selection as Committee chairman had served in the Senate

for sixteen years, had served as chairman of subcommittees
of the Foreign Relations, Government Operations, and
Public Works Committees.

He had been the author of

air and water pollution legislation and revenue sharing,
94

as well as the 1974 Budget Act itself.

Thus, Senator

Muskie commanded a large measure of respect in the

Senate, and had a great deal of experience working with
the major committees of the Senate.

The non-partisan natxire of the budget process in the
Senate can be partially attributed to tbe cooperation
between Chairman Muskie and the ranking Republican Commit

tee member, Henry Bellmon.

Their cooperation began in

the spring of 1975, when the Committee reported its first
94
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budget xesolution to tbe Senate floox.

Altliouglx neither

Muskie nor Belliuon agreed with all the provisions of the

resolution, they decided that the budget process demanded

their support for the Committee's resolution on the floor
of the Senate.

From then on, Muskie and Bellmon consis

tently operated as a team in the Senate.

As a result.

Senate Committee budget resolutions drew support from
Democrats as well as Republicans, and were consistently
approved by wide margins.
Unlike the House Committee, the Republican members

of the Senate Budget Committee were relatively junior
Senators who believed that they could use their Committee
membership to enhance their power in the Senate.

Hence,

they regularly voted with the Committee rather than with
their own ideological views.

Because the members of the

Senate Budget Committee realized that their power in the
Senate would be associated with the rise in stature and

power of the Committee, it was in their interest to ascer

tain that the budget resolutions reported out by the Commit
tee were successfully passed on the Senate floor.

By

cooperating with the Democrats, the Senate Committee
Republicans were able to exert considerably more influence
over the size and shape of budget resolutions than their
counterparts in the House.

Similarly, the Republicans

had more influence over spending priorities in the Senate.

The bipartisan support for budget resolutions in the

88

Senate also helped explain why the Senate Budget Coininittee
was able to develop an aggressive stance in the implemen
tation of the adopted budget resolutions.

As the previous

chapter has discussed, Muskie did not hesitate in taking
a budget debate to the Senate floor, nor did he restrain
himself from making public any dispute resulting from
legislation vdiich violated the budget targets.
In the Senate, the Budget Committee was able to

elicit the support of the Appropriations Committee.

In

0.974, the Budget Committee and the Appropriations Commit

tee engaged in a dispute over the Appropriation Committee's
claim of jurisdiction over Presidential impoundment

proposals.

The

dispute was settled when the committees

agreed to joint jurisdiction, and the relationship has
95

been cooperative since that time.

John McClellan, chair

man of the Senate Appropriations Committee, approved of

the Senate Budget Committee's approach to the development
of the budget resolutions, which did not include the

programmatic detail of the House Committee.

Thus, the

relationship between the Appropriations and Budget
Committees has been characterized as cooperative, based

upon the developing recognition that their interests were
common rather than competitive.

In contrast, the Budget Committee has repeatedly
95
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clashed with the Senate Finance Committee.

The dispute

between the Finance and Budget Committees began with

differing interpretations of the Budget Committee^s role
in influencing tax legislation.

The Budget Committee main

tained that the Budget Act required the report accompanying
th«=> first resolution to specify how the revenue target

should be reached.

Th.e Budget Committee was able to

prevail in 1978 when it was able to force the Finance
Committee to rewrite its original version of the tuition

tax credit legislation.

Hence, the Senate Budget Committee

has not been overwhelmingly successful in establishing

cooperative relationships with other Senate committees.
Another factor which has influenced the effective

ness of the Senate Budget Committee has been the nature

of the budget review.

In contrast to the House Committee

approach, the Senate Budget Committee has steadfastly
avoided debating the merits of individual programs.

The

Budget Committee review began with the presentation of the
Congressional Budget Office's computations of the cost
of maintaining current policy in eacb of the budget
functions.

Typically, Committee members would propose

totals for budget authority and outlays which represented
an increase or a decrease in current policy.

The Commit

tee consciously avoided specifying programs to be cut

or augmented.

The Committee was convinced that this

approach permitted the budget process to focus upon the
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broad issues of fiscal policy and spending priorities,
96

as tha Budget Act had intended.

The Congressional Budget Office

The 1974 Budget Act established the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) to supply Congress with budgetary
information necessary to implement the new budget process.
The Budget Act directed the CBO to provide Congress with
budget analyses and policy analyses.

The budget analyses

included; the scorekeeping function, which offered a com
parison of how enacted legislation corresponded with the
most recent budget resolution; a comparison of the tax

and spending committees' legislation with the most recent
budget resolution; five-yecir projections of the costs
associated with implementing the provisions of every
authorizing bill reported by a House or Senate committee;
and issuance of an annual report projecting total spending,

revenue and tax expenditures for the next five years.

In

the realm of the policy analyses, CBO was required to

report annually by April 1 alternative budget options
that Congress might pursue in the ensuing fiscal year;
and to provide other such analyses of Federal policy to
97

the Budget Committees.
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The director of the CBO is Dr. Alice Rivlin, who

was appointed by the Senate to head the agency established

by the Budget Act to provide Congress its own source of

budget information. Dr. Rivlin was an economist by training
and had served as assistant secretary of Health, Education

and Welfare Planning and Evaluation during the final year
of the Johnson Administration.

Just prior to her selection

as CBO director, Dr. Rivlin performed budget analyses with
the Brookings Institute.

Dr. Rivlin was appointed to serve

a four-year term initially, but it would require the

adoption of

a resolution in either house to effect her

removal at any time.

Dr. Rivlin recruited her initial

staff of 193 employees from the Office of Management and
98

Budget, Brookings Instxtute, and various universities.

Like the Budget Committees, the CBO has had its
share of critics.

Conservative Congressmen, especially in

the House, have attacked the CBO studies or analyses as

being liberal in orientation.

On the other hand, many

liberals have expressed disappointment that the CBO did

not produce the type of broad, incisive analyses of
national policy they would have liked.
CBO has had internal problems.

In addition, the

Early in its existence

Rivlin and her top aides misjudged the amount of work

required for bill costing, providing cost estimates of
Gail Gregg, "Congressional Budget Experts Walk
a Delicate Line on Hill," Conqressionai Quarterly Weekly
Report 37(November 24, 3.9791: 2654.
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spending and tax bills and keeping budget scores for th.e

Budget Committees.
staff.

This error necessitated shifts in the

Despite the criticism, the CEO has won the respect

of supporters and critics alike for its performance in
99

supplying budgetary information to Congress.

CEO's budget analysis division has enabled Congress
to rely upon its own spending and tax estimates, rather
than a reliance upon the Executive branch.

However,

CEO's budget estimates have not often had a direct
impact upon policy, but they have had an influence upon
the outcome of a particular debate.

The House Budget

Committee utilizes the CEO's expertise much differently
than the Senate Committee.

The House views CEO as a

service agency, just one of the resources available for
use, while the Senate Committee views CEO as an extension
of its own staff

For the Congressional Budget

Committees, one of CEO's most important tasks is score-

keeping, computing how enacted legislation compares to the

most recent budget resolution.

The Senate Budget Commit

tee has used this feature more than the House Committee,
which hired a staff to do much of this work itself.

The

Senate Committee has also availed itself more frequently

of the CEO's annual five-year projection of Federal spending
99
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and revenue as a starting point in its preparations of

the first budget resolxition.

Both Budget Coimnittees

have found the CBO's budget analysis useful, except for
its failure to predict or explain the outlay shortfalls

in fiscal years 1976 and 1977.^^^
The CBO has had difficulty in projecting over

five years the budget impact of

every authorization bill

reported by a Congressional committee due to time constraints.
In 1975, CBO did not attempt to meet this requirement as

it was just being organized.

In 1976, it prepared estimates

for 282 authorization bills or 44 percent of those repor

ted.

During the first part of 1977 the percentage improved

to 64 percent.

Part of the problem in reporting the five

year impacts has been the considerable resistance CBO
has encountered from Congressional committees, who have
feared the CBO would reveal the high costs of their

legislation.

But as CBO has become an established part

of Congress and won the respect of the members, the

Congressional committees have become more aware of and
less hostile to CBO.

If CBO's policy analyses have had a major defect
it is that Congress did not use them as much as CBO had
hoped.

Especially in the House, which did not want CBO

to have a policy analysis function in the first place.

^^^Joel Havemann, "After Two Years, CBO Gets
High-Marks From Congress," National Journal 9 CAugust
13, 1977V: 1258.
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there has been resistance.

be attributed to CBO.

Part of the problem could

Some of the analyses were pub

lished too late to have an impact.

The CBO's major

piece of policy analysis, its annual report to the Budget

Committees on budget options for the upcoming fiscal year
failed to make a splash the first two years.

The report

was due by April 1, which made it too late to impact the

first budget resolution.

In 19.77, Dr. Rivlin changed

the format of the report, reducing it to 202 pages and
supporting it with 28 separate publications analyzing
specific issues in greater depth.

The basic report was

published in February, giving Congressional Budget Com

mittees enough time to use the report in preparation
of the first budget resolution.

The Senate Committee

staff mentioned the report once, the House Committee
,
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xgnored it.

Rivlin has tried techniques to bring CBO analyses
to the attention of Congress.

Often she has accompanied

the release of a major report with a press conference.

This strategy has caused many Congressmen, especially

House members, to criticize Rivlin and the CBO.

They

believe CBO is staff of Congress and as such it should
not seek public publicity.

Other critics have complained

that Congressional support agencies, which include the
Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research

^°^Ibid., pp. 1259-60
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Service, the General Accounting Office, and the Office of
Technology Assessment, have duplicated efforts.

Such

concerns led the House and Senate Appropriations Commit
tees in 1975 to direct the four agencies to develop a

research notification system as a means of informing
103

each Other of research efforts.

Also, although CBO

reports have generally been of high quality, the CBO has
been hampered by the fact that it does not have access
to the same information as does the Office of Management

^

^ 104

and Budget.

Thus, the effectiveness of the budget process has

been largely a product of the institutions which the
Budget Act established.

The Budget Committees and the

Congressional Budget Office have successfully contributed
to providing a body of budgetary information where none
existed previously.

They also aided Congress in imple

menting the provisions of budget reform.

The CBO made

available to Congress its own source of policy analysis.
Congress no longer was forced to rely upon the Executive
branch for all Federal budget information.

Thus, the

Budget Committees and the CBO have performed essential
roles in the implementation of the Budget Act.

^Richard E. Cohen, "The Watchdogs for Congress
Often Bark the Same Tune," National Journal 11(September
8, 1979): 1484.

^^^Telephone Interview with Rosalee N. Roberts,
Budget Assistant to Congressman Bill Nelson, Washington,
D.C., 29 February 1980.

CHAPTER V

FURTHER BUDGET REFORH PROPOSALS

The previous chapters have discussed a number of

problems which have hampered the 1974 Budget Act implemen
tation.

Further reforms of tbe Congressional Budget Act

of 1974 have been a topic of great concern and debate.
Both the House and Senate have established Task Forces

on the Budget Process which have held hearings on the
various issues.

A number of bills to amend the budget

process have been offered. This chapter will examine
several of the proposals which have been suggested to
further reform the Congressional budget process.

The

discussion will be limited to proposed changes in the

budget timetable, reforms of the Budget Committees, alter
ations of the scope of the Congressional budget, and
reforms of budget studies.

Altering the Budget Timetable

A number of proposals have been propounded which

would modify the budget timetable established by the 1974

Budget Act. Perhaps the most difficult deadline which
Congress has had to conform to has been the deadline
established to ensure the prompt enactment of appropri
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ations bills. Since the first year of the budget process

implementation, procedural problems were evident in the
authorization process.

The House had consistently been

forced to appropriate funds prior to the enactment of

authorizing legislation.

This resulted in a situation in

which the authorizing committees were required to spend

virtually all their time on budget authorization.

The

budget timetable requirements left little time in the
schedule of the authorization committees for oversight
of the Congressional programs.

Representative Leon E. Panetta, (D.) California,
introduced a bill in the House in September, 1977 entitled

"The Biennial Budgeting Act" which would amend the Congres
sional Budget Act of 1974 to provide for a two-year

budgeting cycle.

The bill would provide one year to

focus upon budgeting and upon Congressional oversight.
The next year would be devoted to appropriations and new

legislation.

The advantage to this approach, according

to Representative Panetta, is that the budget process
would be slowed to such a pace that Congress would be able

to focus upon oversight and review.

It would enable Congress

to prioritize new legislation and provide better budget

planning.

Thus, the biennial authorization system would

provide the necessary time for effective oversight, effec
tive planning and apportion the

Congressional workload in
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a sensxble fashion.

Other Congressmen have suggested modifying some
of the deadlines of the budget timetable.

Senator William

Proxmire, (D.) Wisconsin, stated the requirement that

authorizing conimittees provide the Budget Committees with
advance estimates of outlays and budget authority for the

next fiscal year by March 15 is too stringent.

Proxmire

has suggested dropping the March 15 deadline for advance
estimates and require, instead, that all authorizing
committees report authorizing bills by May 1.

Along with

this, he would require the Budget Committees to report

the first budget resolution by May 15, instead of April 15.
The Budget Committees would have the authorizing bills

by this time and, hence, would have the opportunity to

crystallize their position and make accurate determinations.
Finally, Senator Proxmire's proposal would require final
action on the first concurrent resolution of the budget

by June 15.

Senator Muskie, in responding to Proxmire's

proposal, has voiced concern that the proposed modifications
would result in the passage of a budget resolution after
105

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Rules,

Excerpts from Hearings on Congressional Procedures before

the subcommittee on the Rules and Organization of tHe
House. 95th Congress, 2nd session, 1978, p. 11.
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U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Budget,

Can Congress Control the Power of the Purse?

before the Committee on the Budget.
session, 1978, p. 23.

Hearings

95th Congress, ^d
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the other coininittees have taken action on programs.
This would mean that, in effect, the budget process

would lose the point of maximum influence on Congres
sional decisions.

The authorizing committees, especially

the subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee would

have already made their decisions without the kind of
interplay between the functions and priorities in the
budget which was envisioned by the framers of the 1974
T, ^ 4. Act.
^ 4. 107
Budget

Budget Committee Reforms

Internal changes have been suggested to reform the

procedures of the Budget Committees. The Committees have
already begun to schedule briefings on crucial issues to

be presented by the Committee staff to Budget Committee
members so that they can be informed before Congress

makes crucial policy decisions.

Senator Muskie has

proposed that a greater degree of coordination and consul
tation with other Congressional committees would be a

positive modification of the budget process.

Muskie

proposed that, prior to the March 15 committee reports
being submitted to the Budget Committees, direct consul
tations between the chairmen of the authorizing commit

tees and the chairmen and ranking members of the Budget

Committees be accomplished.

^°^Ibid., p. 28.

This could be done either
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formally or on an informal basis, and would provide an
advance opportunity for ttie committees to discuss future

options.

Then, in the interim between the time of these

meetings and the April 15 deadline for reporting of the
first resolution by the Budget Committees, the Budget
Committees could focus upon specific estimates of program
costs.

Muskie stated that he believed that the quality

of the Budget Committee process would be much improved
with this proposed modification.

Senator William

Proxmire has echoed the sentiments of Muskie in his
108

support of the concept.

Scope of the Budget

There are other proposals which do not directly

relate to reform of the Congressional budget process, but
would affect the oversight ability of Congress.

These

proposals seek an enlargement of the scope of the Congres
sional budget.

One criticism of the Budget Act is that

it does not come to grips with several key obstacles to

effective government budget-making.

The bulk of non

military spending is plagued by "uncontrollables," the

many programs that are protected from being cut during
the budget process by special legislation.

While the

Budget Act was a step forward in control of the "uncon
trollables," it is argued that the Act needs to go beyond
Ibid., p. 32,

j.ai

for a more complete control.

Senator Proxmire has

proposed that Congress conduct a thorough study of the
degree to which it would be able to reduce spending over
some period of time, so that Congress could determine
109

'a sense of the real meaning behind nncontrollables.'

The budget process fails to address the off-budget
Federal agencies, which have been excluded by law from the
budget since enactment of the unified budget concept.

It

has been argued that there is no justification for the
exclusion of these agencies from the budget and that the
exclusion understates the true size of the Federal budget

and deters Congressional oversight of the operations of
these entities.

Thus, it has been proposed that the

off-budget Federal agencies be included in the budget.
The Budget Committees have been urged to prepare
budgets for more than one year at a time.

Dr. Alice

Rivlin, director of the Congressional Budget Office, has

suggested that the Budget Committees begin making decisions
on the basis of five-year fiscal plans.

She has recommended

that the five-year targets be included in the Budget
Committee report with

it

eventually being expanded so

that the five-year targets would be made part of the actual
resolutions voted upon by Congress.

Dr. Rivlin has

109_

Ibid., p. 26.

^^^Office of Management and Budget, Issues: Fiscal
Year 1977 Budget, 1976, pp. 236-7.

Senate Hearings: Budget Process Assessed,"
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 36(January 21, 1978): 103
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stated:

Major changes in the economy cannot be achieved in
a year or two.

Several years of concerted budgetary

policies are needed. Similarly, program goals may take
years to accomplish. Social programs must be phased
in gradually to avoid disruption. Research and
development must be completed before new weapons
systems can be deployed. The design of complex
programs may require years of technical and political
preparation. For all these reasons, it is necessary
for the Congress to take actions today that are designed
to bring about results in the future. Conversely,
the Congress must also take into account now the fact
that actions taken to achieve immediate ends may

have budgetary or functional implications for the
future. Decisions made to respond to needs in the
short term can constrain the choices available to

future Congresses. Making changes in national policy
and keeping current decisions consistent with future
goals could be made considerably easier if the Congress
had a method for systematic reconciliation of future
goals and current decisions. Such a method could be
provided by shifting to a multi-year framework for
budgetary decisions, with the Congress adopting
budgetary targets for five years in advance. This
would compel Congress to consider the future con
sequences of present actions. This in turn would

give the Congress the

opportunity to influence the

size and composition of federal spending and revenues
by choice rather than by accident.112
The Budget Act itself has included a number of

provisions designed to force the Budget Committees and
Congress to examine the budget in a multi-year setting.
The Congressional Budget Office is required to project

the five-year impact of every spending bill which is

reported to the House and Senate floors.

Additionally,

CBO must report to Congress at the beginning of each
fiscal year the spending, revenue, surplus or deficit.
112

U.8., Congress, Senate, Committee on the
Budget, Can Congress Control the Power of the Purse?
Hearings before the Committee on the Budget, p. 75.
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and tax expenditures for the next five years.

In 1978,

the Senate began considering the five-year implications
of various decisions in preparation of the first budget
resolution.

Therefore, the multi-year budgeting proposal

is not a novel idea in Congress.

Representative Richard Boiling, (D.) Missouri,
was one of the prime sponsors of a reform move which
would have included a provision in the Humphrey-Hawkins

full employment bill creating a new method for setting
Congressional economic policy.

The provision would have

required Congress to adopt a resolution each year, written
by the Joint Economic Committee, specifying the long-term
economic goals of Congress.

This would enable Congress to

consider the complete range of economic policy in a longrange context.

The proposal received the support of House

Budget Committee Chairman Robert Giaimo, although most
members of the House Budget Committee opposed it.

They

warned that it would obstruct the roles of the Budget

Committees, reducing them to the mechanical tasks of

setting fiscal policy aggregates which would meet the
Joint Economic Committee goals.

Muskie stated that the
113

proposal would "destroy the credibility of economic policy."
In 1979, a series of amendments were proposed in

Congress which would require in some form a balanced
11 1

Conte, "Budget Committees at Center of Crucial

1979 Policy Fight," p. 18.
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Federal budget.

One such piece of legislation, Senate

Resolution 380, would have required a balanced budget in

fiscal 1981.^^'^ This amendment, along with many others,
was modified by a proposal which was designed to break
the deadlock in the Senate on legislation increasing the

limit on the public debt.

A proposal, drafted by Finance

Committee Chairman Long, Budget Committee Chairman Muskie,
and Senator Bob Packwood, required the Budget Committees

to report on April 15, 1979 a balanced budget for fiscal
1981 and 1982.

The report was also to explain the effects

of balancing the budget on revenues, spending, employment,
inflation and national security.

The proposal would

further require the Budget Coiranittees to report balanced
first resolutions for fiscal 1981 and 1982.

Other Congressmen have advocated reforms which
would establish a statutory limit upon Federal spending.

Representative James R. Jones, (D.) Oklahoma, acknowledged

the advantages of such a Federal spending ceiling as being,
first, not as rigid as a 'balanced budget,' yet would

provide flexibility for Congress to deal with economic or
national crises.

A statutory spending ceiling would

enable Congress to trim spending and deal effectively with
the special interests who continually press for more
programs and more funding.

^^^Larry Pressler, United States Senate, Washington,
D.C., Personal Letter, 21 April 1980.

James R. Jones, "Reality Dawning; Uncle Sam's
Pockets Are Not Bottomless," San Diego Union 23 December
1979, section 3, p. C-5.
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Budget Studies

Several refonns have been suggested to modify the

approach of the Congressional Budget Office.

A key-

suggestion to revamp the CBO would require that the budget
analysis division and the policy analysis division be
combined.

Critics of the CBO's organization maintain that

the tasks of budget analysis and policy analysis should
have been combined in each functional area of the budget,
as the Office of Management and Budget is organized.

The

Congressional Budget Committees have argued that there
is considerable overlap between budget analysis and policy

analysis and have urged Dr. Rivlin to combine these
functions.

Rivlin has resisted reorganization on the

basis that the separation provides a method of keeping

long-range fiscal analysis from being
daily cost estimate functions.

inundated by the

Hence, CBO staffers

work in six major depar-tments: budget analysis, fiscal
analysis, tax analysis, natural resources and commerce,

human resources and community development, and national
116

security and international affairs.

An internal reform undertaken by Dr. Rivlin has

already contributed to CBO effectiveness. Dr. Rivlin
decided the annual budget report of CBO came too late in

the budget season to be useful to the Budget Committees.
1.16

Gregg, "Congressional Budget Experts Walk a
Delicate Line on Hill," p. 2654.
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Thus, the timing was altered and the report was published
earlier in the year.

This has been discussed in the chap

ter on implementation of the budget process.

Congressmen have suggested the need of a clarifi
cation of CBO's role.

Each branch of Congress generally

viewed CBO differently - the Senate considered CBO as an

independent agency while the House viewed it essentially
as a staff arm of Congress.

Congressional hearings on the

oversight of the CBO have pointed repeatedly to the need
to clarify this issue by reforming the Budget Act.
Finally, Congressmen have voiced their concern

that the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional
Research Service, the General Accounting Office and the

Office of Technology Assessment have tended to duplicate

efforts in pursuing their various responsibilities.

The

House Select Committee on Congressional Operations, which
was disbanded in 1979, stated that the four agencies

"have failed to realize the full potential of encouraging

greater coordination, including the planning and develop
ment" of broad studies which involve at least two of the
117

four agencies.

.

. .

Representative Giaimo, appearing

before the Senate Budget Committee, has stated that, in
the House, legislative oversight on the budgets of the
117

Cohen, "The Watchdogs for Congress Often Bark

the Same Tune," p. 1488.
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CBO, GAO, and CRS has continually stressed the need to
ensure these agencies cooperate with each other to
118

eliminate such a duplication of effort.

Hence, steps

have been taken in Congress which have ordered the four

agencies to establish a more formal coordinating mechanism.
While the reform proposals discussed in this

chapter in no way offer a complete analysis of the myriad
reforms proposed since the passage of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974, it does provide an insight into some
of the continuing budgetary issues which Congress must

resolve.

The next chapter will investigate how well

Congress has succeeded in achieving the initial objectives
of the Budget Act, and will offer some concluding comments

regarding the merits of further reforming the Congressional
budget process.

118

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Budget,
Can Congress Control the Power of the Purse? Hearings
before the Committee on the Budget, ^ 40.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Has Congress achieved the legislative objectives
of the 1974 Budget Act?

When the Budget Act was passed

by Congress in 1974, it was envisioned that the legis
lation would achieve the following objectives: (1) enable
Congress to set fiscal policy; (2) enable Congress to
determine the government's spending priorities; (3) estab
lish a budget timetable which could be successfully
implemented; (4) provide a budgetary education for Congress
men; and (5) establish Congress as an equal partner with
the Executive branch in the making of Federal budget
policy.

If successful, the Budget Act would for the first

time enable Congress to shape legislation into a coherent
expression of budget policy.
This chapter will attempt to evaluate the success

with which Congress has achieved the aforementioned objec
tives.

Although a complete and thorough evaluation by a

Congressional outsider is virtually impossible, a concerted
effort will be made to determine whether Congress has been
successful in implementing the provisions of the Budget

Act, and hence has utilized the policy tool which it
has provided.

This chapter will conclude with some
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subjective recommendations based upon the evaluation.
Setting Fiscal Policy

For the first time, the budget process enabled
Congress to set fiscal policy.

The Budget Act provided

a mechanism that Congress successfully used to identify
the outlines of the Federal budget.

As it was designed,

the Budget Act was successful in focusing Congressional
attention on the budget totals - spending, revenue and

the deficit.

On the spending side of the budget. Congres

sional fiscal policy had great impact.

Congress, for

once, was kept aware of the deficit, and hence the

budget process may have succeeded in dissuading spending
that would have otherwise been enacted.

Nevertheless,

the budget process made Congress fully aware of the

fiscal implications of budget policies and their impact
upon the national economy.

Determining Spending Priorities
The budget process was less successful as a tool

for the determination of spending priorities in Congress.
The practical realities of Congressional politics precluded
a full scale debate of spending priorities.

However,

the budget process did force Congress to become aware of
the spending priorities which resulted from individual
program decisions.

In establishing spending targets. Congress was

110

forced to deal with a budget which was basically predeter
mined.

The Budget Committees used the budget resolutions

mainly as a vehicle to predict spending and revenue for
the next fiscal year.

Also, the Budget Act provided that

spending be divided into sixteen budgetary functions.

These categories did not correspond to the spending bills.
Thus, the potential to influence spending priorities was

substantially reduced.

Nevertheless, the potential mech

anism for determining spending priorities was established

in the Budget Act.

As Congress strives in the next

several years to enact balanced budgets, it is more than

plausible that it will, of necessity, turn to debate of
spending priorities in implementing fiscal constraint.

Adherence to Budget Timetable

Congress has experienced mixed success in attempting

to implement the timetable established by the Budget Act.
Prior to budget reform. Congress had not enacted all its
regular appropriations bills before July 1, the start of

the fiscal year, since 1948.

1976 was the first year

that Congress attempted to enforce the budget timetable
and it was successful in doing so.

In 1977, however.

Congress was not as successful, as serious problems with
the budget timetable began to become evident.

Three of

the regular appropriations bills were delayed for nearly
three months beyond the start of the fiscal year in 1977.

1X1 

In 1978, Congress completed action on the budget on

September 23, some eight days beyond the budget timetable

deadline but still prior to the start of the fiscal year,
October 1.

However, in May 1979 Congress had to revise

the figures of the second resolution due to higher than
expected costs and various supplemental appropriations.

The Congressional budget process faced serious challenges
in 1979 with the ever-increasing desire of Congress to
cut spending and move toward a balanced Federal budget.
The second budget resolution was not enacted in 1979

until November 28, primarily due to an impasse within
the conference committee over funding for various programs,
Congressional Budget Education

If there has been one overwhelming success of the

budget process, it has been in Congressional budget
education.

Congressmen, soon after passage of the Budget

Act, found themselves immersed in debates of the fine

points of economics.

Liberals who had been inclined to

favor increased spending learned from the budget process
that funding was limited.

At the same time, conservatives

found that deficits were inevitable when high unemployment
rates depressed income tax revenue and increased welfare

spending.

Congressmen quickly became informed of all the

consequences of their budgetary decisions.

In 1975 and

1976 when budget resolutions were reported to the House

112

floor, the most conservative Republicans regularly
offered amendments to balance the budget by cutting

spending.

By 1977, they had realized that spending cuts

alone were not sufficient, and they proposed tax cuts

to stimulate the economy and reduce the government-con
119

trolled portion of the economy.

Six years following budget reform evidenced a

much better informed Congress also.

The Budget Committees'

staffs and the Congressional Budget Office provided
Congress with the necessary budget information to enable
Congress to compute for itself the effect which individual

spending and revenue decisions had upon the overall budget.
No longer did Congress have to rely upon the Executive
branch for budgetary information.

The CBO also provided

Congress its own source of policy analysis, and Congress
no longer was forced to accept the Executive budget as
the Bible.

Budget Equality with Executive
Many years of evalution will be required to deter

mine whether Congress has used budget reform to end Pres
idential domination of budget policy.

The initial indica

tion is that if the balance is shifting, it is doing so
at a slow rate of speed.

Congress still relies heavily

upon the President's budget.
119

Havemann, p, 206.

Nevertheless, Congress has

113

been able to modify the President's budget.

Recommendat1ons

A clear case can be established for enacting
changes in the budget process.

Timing seems to be a

fundamental problem in an evaluation of the process.
notion of a two-year budget cycle is meritorious.

The

It

would enable Congress to deal quickly with routine budget
decisions and provide additional time to debate the

merits of complex issues.

Any reform of the budget process

should be balanced with the provision of an adequate
amount of time for the now-existing process to become
viable and to prove itself to be an effective mechanism.

The Budget Committees have but recently begun to prove

their effectiveness, and CEO is still encountering prob
lems.

Nevertheless, it is apparent that more budget over

sight does and did lead to better control over the size

and content of the budget.

Any provisions for further

reform need to be carefully examined regarding their

impact upon the existing budget system.
In conclusion, it appears that the most significant
challenges for the new budget process remain to be encoun
tered in the 1980's.

As Congress' main instrument for

setting fiscal policy, it will have to resolve budget
issues in an environment best characterized as a mix of

continued inflation with an increasing recession.

The
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budget process will also be challenged by the intense
pressure placed upon Congress to enact, for the first

time in decades, balanced budgets. A few years ago, many
would have doubted the new budget process could withstand
the pressures the 1980's are sure to produce.

But now it

appears clear that the process will survive, and further

that it will become strengthened by the challenges facing
it.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"Binding Budget Levels."

1979 Congressional Quarterly

Almanac 35: 175-80.

"Budget Conferees Divided."

Congressional Quarterly Weekly

Report 37 (October 20, 1979): 2316.

Burkhead, Jesse V. "Federal Budgetary Developments: 1947
48." Public Administration Review 8 (Autxiran 1948):
267-74";^

~~

Cannon, Clarence. "IV. Congressional Responsibilities."
in "Formulating the Federal Government's Economic
Program: A Symposium." American Political Science
Review 42 (April, 1948): 307-16.

Clark, Timothy B.

"Appropriations Committees Losing Their

Grip on Spending."

National Journal 10 (July 22,

1978): 1169-74.

.

"GOP Presses 1980 Tax Cut, But Democrats Aren't

Biting."

National Journal 11 (August 25, 1979):

1396-1400.

Cohen, Richard E.

"The Congressional Budget Process - Is

it Worth All the Headaches?"

National Journal

11 (September 29, 1979): 1605-T;

.

"The Watchdogs for Congress Often Bark the Same

Tune."

National Journal 11 (September 8, 1979):

1484-88

Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
U.S. Code, volume 31 (1974).

"Congressional Budget Office: Under Fire."

Congressional

Quarterly Weekly Report 34 (June 5, 1976): 1430-2.

Conte, Christopher. "Budget Committees at Center of
Crucial 1979 Policy Fight." Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report 37 (January 6, 1979); 11-18.

___.

"Budget Conferees Settle on $23 Billion Deficit."

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 37 (May 19,
1979): 943-6.

115

116

Conte, Christopher R.

"Budget: Liberals Force Social

Spending Hike."

Congressional Quarterly Weekly

Report 37 (May 26, 1979): 995-67
.

"Carter and Congress Agree to Scale Back Tax

Cuts; Budget Targets Approved." Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report 36 (May 20, 1978): 1285-6.

. "Coiranittees Approve Fiscal '79 Budget Targets."
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 36 (April 15,
1978): 900-2.

. "Congress* Resolve to Curb Spending Faces First
Test." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 37
(March 31, 1979): 547-9+.

- "Democratic Coalition Nears Budget Test."
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 37 (May 5,
1979): 815-7.

. "House Approves Binding Fiscal 1979 Budget Totals."
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 36 (August
19, 1978): 2217.

. "House Bogs Dovm in Budget Amendments." Congres
sional Quarterly Weekly Report 37 (May 12, 1979):
877-80.

. "House Budget Unit Reduces Carter Deficit by
$3.5 Billion." Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report 37 (April 7, 1979): 669-70.

.

"House Debates Budget Priorities for Fiscal *79."

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 36 (May 6,
1978): 1095-6.

•

"House Narrowly Approves Budget Targets."

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 36 (May 13,
1978): 1197-8.

. "Public Works Dispute Stalls Budget Conference;
Tax Bill Markup Begins." Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report 36 (.September 16, 1978): 2455-6.

. "Second Budget Resolution Should Be Lower than
First." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 36
(August 5, 1978): 2015.

. "Senate Approves Three-Year Fiscal Plan."
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 37 (April 28,
1979): 809-10.

117

Conte, Christopher R. "Senate Coinmittee Proposes One-Year
Tax Cut Delay to Balance 1981 Budget." Congres
sional Quarterly Weekly Report 37 (April l4. 1979^ i
684-7.

. "Senate Hearings: Budget Process Assessed."
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 36 (January
21, 1978): 103.

• "Senate Seeks Alternative to Balanced Budget
Straitjacket." Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report 37 (March 24, 1979): 503-4.

•

"Senate Upholds Committee on Budget Targets."

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 36 (Aori]
29, 1978): 1029-31.

•

"Senate Votes $489.5 Billion Spending Ceiling."

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 36 (September
9, 1978): 2421-22.

Debt Ceiling Act.

Statutes at Large, volume 86 (1972).

"Fiscal 1979 Ceiling: $487.5 Billion Budget Compromise
Approved."

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report

36 (September 23, 1978): 2584-6.

Galloway, George B. Congress at the Crossroads.
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1946.
• The Legislative Process in Congress.
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1953.
Gregg, Gail.

New York:
New York:

"Budget Resolution Cleared As House Turns

Back GOP Spending Cut Manuever."

Congressional

Quarterly Weekly Report 37 (December 1. 19795:
2713-4.

. "Conferees Set $29.8 Billion Budget Deficit;
Increase Defense, Social Spending."

Congressional

Quarterly Weekly Report 37 (November 3. 1979):
2452-3.

_. _ "Congressional Budget Experts Walk a Delicate
Line on Hill."

Congressional Quarterly Weekly

Report 37 (November 24, 1979): 2653-4.

"House, Senate Still Disagree on Ordering
Spending Cuts." Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report 37 (November 10, 1979); 2514.

118

Gregg, Gail. "Senate Offers Comprcanise On Spending Cut
Instruction in 1980 Budget Resolution." Congres
sional Quarterly Weekly Report 37 CWovember 24,
1979): 2673-4.

Harris, Joseph P. Congressional Control Of Administration.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, JL964.

Hart, Gary.
D.C.

Senator.

United States Senate.

Washington,

Personal Letter, 23 Rlay 1980.

Havemann, Joel.

"A Good Year for the Congressional Budget

Process."

National Journal 10 (September 23. 1978):

1501-3.

-

"A Shift to the Right."

National Journal 10

(June 3, 1978): 886.

"After Two Years, CBO Gets High Marks From
Congress."

National Journal 19 (Auqust 13, 1977):

1256-60.

. Congress and the Budget. Bloomington, Illinois:
Indiana University Press, 1978.

.

"The Budget Committees Under Siege."

National

Journal 10 (April 8, 1978): 563.

•

"The Congressional Budget Committees - High

Marks After the First Years." National Journal
8 (September 25, 1976): 1346-52":

.

"Trimming the 'Thanksgiving Turkey'."

National

Journal 9 (November 5, 1977): 1733.

Jones, James R.

"Reality Dawning: Uncle Sam's Pockets

Are Not Bottomless,"

San Diego Union, 23 December

1979, section 3, p. C-5.

Nelson, Dalmas H.

"The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950."

Journal of Politics 15 (May 1953): 274-88.

Neustadt, Richard E.

"Presidency and Legislation: The

Growth of Central Clearance."

American Political

Science Review 48 (1954): 641-71.

"New Budget System Survives First Year Intact."

Congres

sional Quarterly Weekly Report 33 (December 27,
1975): 2863-6.

Office of Management and Budget.

Issues: Fiscal Year 1977

Budget, 236-40 April 1976.

-119

Pfiffriex, Jaiiies P.

The Pxesidgnt, the Budget and Congress

Impoundment and the 1974 Budget Act.

Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1979.

Pressler, Larry.

"Fed's 'Tight Money' Policy Putting

Squeeze on U.S. Small Business."

National

Small Business Association Economic Le'tter 1
(May 1980).
~~~
~

Senator.
B.C.

United States Senate.

Washington,

Personal Letter, 21 April 1980

Roberts, Rosalee N.

Budget Assistant to Congressman Bill

Nelson, Washington, D.C.

Telephone Interview,

29 February 1980.

Saloma, John S. III.

"The Responsible Use of Power; A

Critical Analysis of the Congressional Budget
Process." In Congress and the Federal Budget,
pp. 103-204. Edited by American Enterprise

Institute for Public Policy Research.

Washington,

D.C., 1965.

Sharkansky, Ira.

The Politics of Taxing

and Spending.

New York: The Bobbs Merrill Company, Inc., 1969.

The Federalist, No. 58.

Quoted in Joel Havemann, Congress

and the Budget, p. 3. Bloomington, Illinois:
Indiana University Press, 1978.
U.S. Congress. House. Budget Resolution. House Resolution
485, 80th Congress, 2d session, 1948.

U.S. Congress.

House.

Committee on Rules.

Excerpts from

Hearings on Congressional Procedures before the

subcommittee on the Rules and Organization of the
House, 95th Congress. 2d session. 1978.

U.S. Congress.

House.

Committee on the Budget.

The

Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act

of 1974: A General Explanation, by George Gross,
Executive Director House Committee on the Budget.
October, 1975.

U.S. Congress.

Senate.

Budget Resolution.

Senate Res

olution 42, 80th Congress, 2d session, 1948.

120

U.S. Congress.

Senate.

Coramittee on Government

Operations. "Experience with a Leqislative
Budget." Testimony by Louis Fisher before

Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management and
Expenditures. Improving Congressional Control
of the Budget. Hearings. 93d Congress, 1st
session, 1973.

U.S. Congress.

Senate.

Committee on the Budget.

Can

Congress Control the Power of the Purse?

Hearings before the Committee on the Budget,
95th Congress, 2d session, 1978.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Senator Bellmon speaking for a
balanced budget. 96th Congress, 1st session,
24 April 1979.

U.S. Congress.

Congressional Record, volume 125.

92d Congress, 25 July 1946.

Congressional

Record.

U.S. Congress.

92d Congress, 2 August 1946.

Congressional

Record.

U.S. Congress.

94th Congress, 18 February 1948.

Congres

sional Record.

U.S. Congress.

94th Congress, 27 February 1948.

sional Record.

U.S. Constitution.

Article I, section 8.

U.S. Constitution.

Article I, section 9.

Congres

